China Isn’t Pursuing Energy Independence
The world's largest importer of oil and gas has the territory and reserves to vastly increase production. But Beijing continues to bet instead on seaborne trade, prioritizing growth over war.
By the end of 2024, China is expected to displace the U.S. as the world’s largest consumer of oil.1 At an estimated 44,276 terawatt-hours (TWh) of energy consumption in 2022, China consumes more energy than any country in the world by a considerable margin, 66% more than the United States, which comes second.2 But whereas U.S. energy consumption has stagnated since 2000 and, per capita, peaked all the way back in 1973, both China’s total and per capita energy consumption have grown about ten times over since the 1970s and remain on an upward trajectory.3 This vast hunger for energy has been satisfied primarily by domestic coal mining. As of 2022, 55% of China’s total energy consumption—including electricity, transportation, and heating—came from coal, followed by oil at 18% and natural gas at 8%.4 But, over time, China has been slowly meeting more demand with nuclear power, solar photovoltaics, and natural gas. Although it is not usually thought of as such, China is a major global producer of oil and gas thanks to its vast territory.
In 2023, at roughly 4.2 million barrels per day, China produced more oil than Iran, Brazil, or the United Arab Emirates, though far below the United States’ 12.9 million, Russia’s 10.1 million, or Saudi Arabia’s 9.7 million.5 China was the fourth-largest producer of natural gas worldwide, producing nearly as much as Iran, though again far behind the U.S. and Russia.6 Very little of this is exported, as these production rates are not even high enough to meet the vast domestic demand of Chinese industry: although China produced about 58% of its own gas demand in 2023, it can only produce about a quarter of its current oil demand.7 In addition to being a major producer, China is also the world’s biggest importer of both oil and gas. Oil is necessary for fuel and is a key feedstock in China’s chemical industry, the world’s largest.
To meet this shortfall, China has imported vast amounts of oil and gas from every possible source and has supported infrastructure buildup to make these imports as diverse and cheap as possible, including by building pipelines through remote regions, building terminals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) transported by sea, and building up domestic oil refining capacity through state-owned enterprises, rather than importing refined petroleum products. Growing adoption of electric vehicles is also expected to reduce oil demand.
This vast energy appetite means the country’s energy security, which underpins its economy and thus the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), will then be a considerable factor in China’s military and foreign policy in the medium-term. But China is not pursuing substantial improvements in deep drilling technology to make use of currently-uneconomical hydrocarbon reserves, nor is it in a hurry to build out land-based hydrocarbon infrastructure that would be robust to a naval blockade or war. Although China is more energy-independent than Japan or Europe, for the foreseeable future, this vast and growing Chinese demand for oil and gas will still depend on seaborne trade, including with staunch U.S. allies like Australia.
China Drills For Its Own Oil and Gas At Home
If China were a far less populous or industrial country, its oil and gas reserves would be recognized as some of the world’s most significant. As of 2018, it had proven reserves of oil of 25.6 billion barrels, comparable to Qatar or Kazakhstan, and proven natural gas reserves of 5.4 trillion cubic meters, more than Canada or Australia.8 China’s natural gas production grew nearly ten times over from 2000 to 2023.9 Major hydrocarbon reserves are held offshore, as well as in the far western province of Xinjiang, the northeastern provinces bordering Russia that used to be known as Manchuria, and some central provinces like Shaanxi and Gansu.10
Estimates of China’s oil reserves can vary widely. According to the energy research firm Rystad Energy, when accounting for expected recoverable oil from existing fields, undiscovered fields, and contingent recoverable resources that may not be commercially viable, China could have up to 75 billion barrels of potential reserves, more than the United Arab Emirates' estimated maximum of 72 billion barrels.11 Whether an estimate is based on proven resources or a country's estimated potentially recoverable reserves significantly changes the figure. For the world, proven and probable reserves of existing fields are just 505 billion barrels, but when accounting for recoverable expected reserves, it jumps to 1.6 trillion barrels.12 These estimates vary based on qualitative assessments of geological potential and technical or economic feasibility.
China also has significant oil resources in shale, rock formations that require hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” to access, by pumping highly pressurized fluid underground to fracture bedrock and release hydrocarbons. Across five major shale basins, the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimated in 2015 that China has 32 billion barrels of oil that is recoverable with current technology. This is behind only the U.S. and Russia.13 However, when accounting for the maximum potential oil in place, the figure increases to a speculative 643 billion barrels, the vast majority of which cannot be accessed with current technology.14 Such high estimates are highly uncertain and based on incomplete information and forecasts of geological limits. Based on the Chinese government’s figure for official proven oil reserves, China would only have enough oil to meet four to five years of current demand.15
In contrast, the 2015 EIA analysis shows China's shale natural gas potential is enormous. There are seven significant basins, with 32 trillion cubic meters of recoverable reserves, the largest in the world. This figure accounts for technically recoverable resources out of an estimated 134 trillion cubic meters of total gas in place.16 This would be enough gas to serve China’s domestic gas needs, drastically increase energy consumption, and even build an enormous export market. There are seven major basins hosting the major shale oil and gas potential. The deep inland province of Sichuan and the inland Yangtze basin host over 70% of China’s estimated shale gas potential. The rest is spread out over five basins with large quantities of oil. An estimated 63% of shale oil potential is located in the Tarim and Junggar basins, both in Xinjiang and nearly all the remainder is located in the Songliao basin in Manchuria.17
The Chinese hydrocarbon industry revolves around three state-owned companies, which in total have over 800,000 employees and close to $1 trillion in revenue.18 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), often referred to by the name of its primary subsidiary PetroChina, is the country’s primary producer of oil and gas.19 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (CPCC), through its main subsidiary Sinopec, is the country’s largest refiner of petroleum fuels and petrochemicals. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the smallest and oldest of the organizations, is primarily responsible for offshore oil exploration and production.
While CNOOC is a more specialized company focusing on offshore oil extraction, PetroChina and Sinopec are not specialist companies but fully integrated oil and gas companies. This is due to a government-led asset swap in 1998, where PetroChina sold some of its oil fields to Sinopec, which transferred some of its refineries. That same year, the three companies established subsidiaries containing their best-performing assets to list on international stock exchanges to raise funds. These companies are primarily responsible for increasing or maintaining domestic oil and natural gas production or funding exploration and production abroad. They also own and operate refineries.
While Chinese gas production from shale resources has grown, it has disappointed initial expectations. After projecting 100 billion cubic meters (bcm) of annual output from shale by 2020 in 2012, the figure for 2021 was 22 bcm.20 A significant reason is that such shale resources are deep underground, often more than 4 kilometers.21 Chinese shale resources are substantially deeper and more disparate than those in the United States. U.S. fracking wells are, on average, 2.5 kilometers deep.22 In contrast, the wells in Sichuan are rarely less than 3.5 kilometers deep, in part because of the province’s mountainous terrain.23 Deeper wells mean higher drilling costs and increased costs for sand and liquid materials to fracture the rock. Because Chinese shale resources are more fragmented, this limits the length of sideways drilling and forces more wells to be drilled to tap an equivalent amount of resources.
These challenges have meant Chinese companies have had to reverse-engineer or even optimize U.S. drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies to meet their demands. For example, Sinopec reverse-engineered “bridge plugs” to prevent gas from escaping during the drilling phase. This was achieved through a joint venture with the U.S. company Serva Group.24 Sinopec has also developed more powerful pressure pumps for hydraulic fracturing in deeper wells.25 Since 2011, U.S. oilfield drilling companies Halliburton, Baker Hughes, and Schlumberger have been expected to benefit from Chinese fracking.26 After 2014, they began pulling back from the Chinese market.27 Western oil companies like Shell, British Petroleum, and Chesapeake Energy entered joint ventures but have largely quit after disappointing results.28
Progress in exploiting shale oil and gas has been slow, but continues to be promising. After beginning from nothing in 2011, shale gas production was 24 bcm in 2022, more than 10% of China’s total. Unconventional gas—including tight gas, shale, coalbed methane, and natural gas hydrates—production was 96 bcm in 2023, 43% of total production.29 PetroChina and Sinopec anticipate shale gas production will reach 55 bcm by 2035.30 In contrast, U.S. shale gas production was 755 bcm in 2023.31 Shale oil, produced mainly in the west of the country, reached 4 million tons in 2023, 2% of total oil production that year.32 Nevertheless, it has more than quadrupled since 2018.33
Sinopec, PetroChina, and CNOOC own 95% of shale production and most of the oilfield services companies necessary to drill wells.34 They only began awarding service contracts to independent firms in 2017.35 Jianghan No. 4 Machinery Plant produces most Chinese fracking trucks and pumps. It was initially a state-owned factory under the Ministry of Petroleum and is now a subsidiary of Sinopec. PetroChina has a subsidiary for fracking equipment in Baoji Machinery. Other non-state-controlled companies include SPT Energy Group, Anton Oilfield Services Group, Honghua Group, and Jereh Group. Honghua, partially owned by China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC), has developed electric frac pumps, which are more powerful than diesel-powered frac pumps and are utilized for deeper wells. While there is scope for smaller companies to build domestic variants of fracking technology, the industry is firmly controlled by the big three state companies.
In 2012, the U.S. Geological Survey indicated that 12 billion barrels of oil and 4.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas may exist in the South China Sea. Only a fifth of this is expected to exist in contested waters.36 This represents a significant part of relatively new Chinese production and is dominated by CNOOC. In 2023, 12 billion cubic meters of gas production was offshore.37 Meanwhile, from 2020 to 2024, 60% of new oil production was located offshore.38 While land-based shale oil and gas is potentially enormous but very hard to extract, offshore oil and gas production has less potential but is very straightforward to access for China’s sophisticated petroleum industry. In 2021, the Bohai offshore oilfield cluster off the coast of Beijing became the largest production field.39
Current Chinese oil and gas production is insufficient to meet rising demand. The Daqing field in the far northern province of Heilongjiang, the Shengli field in Shandong near Beijing, and the Changqing field in Inner Mongolia have been some of the most significant production sources. But they have declined for years.40 By 2015, their decreasing output had led Chinese output overall to decline. Total oil production fell from 4.4 million barrels per day to 3.8 million barrels per day in 2018.41 As a result, the central government pushed PetroChina, Sinopec, and CNOOC to increase upstream capital expenditure to increase domestic production between 2016 and 2024.42 This led to some increased shale production, but significant increases have been offshore. China’s oil production has somewhat recovered to 4.3 million barrels a day in 2023.43 This underscores the central government’s role in directing the Chinese oil and gas industries.
Extraction of oil and natural gas is only partially a question of lucky geography. Saudi Arabia is a significant oil producer primarily because its bountiful reserves are shallow and thus cheap to extract. China’s cost per barrel is currently $30 per barrel, compared to $21 in the U.S., $19 in Russia, and $9 in Saudi Arabia, and will likely increase as more unconventional wells are tapped.44 China does have considerable reserves of oil and natural gas that, given new technological advances, might become economical to exploit, changing their energy situation significantly. As late as the 2000s, U.S. oil and gas reserves were considered increasingly irrelevant, but became easy to access with new hydraulic fracturing and lateral drilling techniques.
Increased attention to and reliance on more difficult-to-extract resources increases the probability of improvements in technology or logistics that ultimately decrease this cost and make far more oil and gas accessible. The degree to which Chinese suppliers could access even a fraction of China’s potentially vast shale oil and gas resources depends on new technological improvements. A significant part of this would be improved drilling technology, such as that developed in Iceland for geothermal energy deep underground. Similar to China’s agricultural sector, China’s oil and gas production is substantial and has real potential to expand further, but this expansion is neither guaranteed nor a top government priority, especially when the same resources can be acquired more easily, quickly, and cheaply through imports.
State-Owned Enterprises Have Built Up Refining Capacity
Crude oil and natural gas must be refined into fuels like gasoline and petrochemical feedstocks like naphtha. Refined hydrocarbons are either sold as fuel or used in the production of petrochemicals, particularly ethylene, propylene, and paraxylene, which are ultimately converted into intermediate or end-use products.45 As of late 2023, China’s refining capacity is 18 million barrels per day, 12 million of which is owned by the three state companies.46 This is currently more than enough to meet domestic demand and the government has, since 2021, sought to restrict new refinery capacity.
In 2022, the utilization rate for China’s refineries was 73%, compared to 91% in the U.S.47 Besides the three major state-owned enterprises, sixty independent refineries, colloquially known as “teapots,” process about a fifth of China’s crude oil imports and represent a third of total refining capacity. They are most prominent in the Shengli oil field in coastal Shandong province southeast of Beijing, with 70% of independent refining capacity hosted there.48
There are several steps in refining oil into fuels or feedstocks for petrochemicals. The first phase is atmospheric distillation. Here, crude oil is heated to 700 degrees Fahrenheit and injected into a tower, divided into sections split by various temperatures. The lighter hydrocarbons condense at the top, while heavier hydrocarbons condense at the bottom. The heaviest hydrocarbons are drawn off into a vacuum tower to separate vacuum gas oil (VGO) from low-quality vacuum resid. After the process of separation, higher-quality light hydrocarbons are sent for treatment.
Lower-quality heavy hydrocarbons are converted through either cracking—using heat and a catalyst to break down hydrocarbons into lighter substances—or deep conversion. This involves “coking” the lowest value vacuum resids into solid carbon (petroleum coke) and using visbreakers to crack vacuum resid to reduce its viscosity for fuel oil blending. Once heavier hydrocarbons have been converted, the next stage is treatment, where impurities like sulfur and other contaminants are reduced. After this, refiners blend different batches of hydrocarbons to create refined fuels like kerosene for jet fuel, diesel, gasoline, and naphtha.
The independent oil refineries, or “teapots,” are long established in China’s refining industry and the government has sought to consolidate them for over two decades with limited success. They developed in the 1960s, refining excess oil that leaked out of the Shengli field’s pipelines.49 Shengli oil is called aliphatic crude, making it a convenient feedstock for more basic petroleum products like asphalt for roads. Some of the independent refiners are even older, tracing their origins to before the ascension of the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1940s. For example, Shaanxi Yanchang Petroleum, founded in 1905, is China’s oldest petroleum company.
Since 1999, the Chinese government’s official state policy has been to restrict independent refinery access to oil imports, leading to gradual consolidation in favor of the big three state-owned companies. The government’s push for consolidation in oil matches its attempts to rationalize production in other industries where there is excess capacity, including in the mining of rare earths or the steel industry. The Chinese government has sought to consolidate small refineries into larger ones, establishing new large, privately-held mega-refineries. The most prominent examples are Zhejiang Petrochemical, Hengli Petrochemical, and Shenghong Petrochemical. However, these have yet to be established in Shandong province.50
Independents have circumvented being denied access to crude oil imports by buying excess crude from the big three and low-quality fuel oil that has already been partially refined, such as the Russian M100, a low-quality heavy fuel used for ships and power plants.51 They have also been able to fight central government pressure due to their influence on local governments. They are often significant sources of local tax revenue and, at the same time, are often saddled with excessive debt from local banks. For example, Tianhong New Energy, a major refinery in Shandong province, avoided bankruptcy due to local officials convincing a local highway company to invest in them.52 Independents have also managed to avoid taxes on particular grades of petroleum by mislabeling their products, often with local government assistance.
From 2005 to 2015, Chinese refining capacity grew from 6.5 million barrels per day to 14.2 million.53 The independents’ capacity share doubled from 13% to 29% in that time. Despite this, up to 2015, independent refineries generally had meager utilization rates, in part due to the central government restricting their access to oil imports.54 The big three work with independent refineries, even buying their refined fuel products at discount rates instead of processing their own. They also offload unwanted crude oil to independents if the high oil price makes refining their fuels and chemicals unattractive. Independents were sufficiently successful at fighting central government pressure that, in 2015, they were afforded crude oil import quotas dependent on closing their smaller refineries and investing in liquefied natural gas infrastructure.55
The independent refineries are in most cases older than the big three state firms, with CNOOC being formed in 1982 and PetroChina and Sinopec being created in the 1990s. The persistence of these non-state-owned refineries is an example of China’s economic decentralization, which has been a key plank of China’s vigorous economic growth since the 1980s and which has enabled Chinese live players to build functional companies. Still, their capacity to innovate has proven limited, and they cannot solve China’s shortfalls in domestic oil and natural gas extraction.
While there have been live players in the Chinese oil and gas industry, they have been marginalized by the central government. Ye Jianming, the former head of the now-defunct CEFC Energy conglomerate, is an example.56 Ye brought unwanted oil assets to China with the help of Hong Kong investors and subsequently brokered deals with foreign oil producers to secure oil imports to China. The company secured oil rights from foreign governments, ran oil transportation networks, and maintained an oil trading desk in Singapore, recording revenues of up to $15 billion by 2015.57 He effectively helped China access oil beyond the purview of the state-owned enterprises.
In 2018, Ye was detained, and CEFC has since become defunct.58 Another notable individual in the Chinese oil industry was the late Yang Qinglong, who brokered deals between the three major oil companies and sanctioned Iranian oil producers, enabling China to become Iran’s primary destination for oil exports while under U.S. sanctions.59 But these figures are exceptions. Chinese oil and gas production, developments in new technology, and investments abroad are all largely monopolized by the big three state-owned companies, like in China’s nuclear or defense industries. These companies have been able to significantly increase gas production and maintain oil production in recent years, but it is unclear whether they can develop new technologies or productivity improvements to access China’s currently largely inaccessible bounty of shale oil and gas.
China Expects to Continue Importing Oil and Gas By Sea
China produces well over half of its gas and coal consumption. But from 2007 to 2019, as its oil consumption rose rapidly, China went from importing 47% of its crude oil consumption to 73%.60 It has remained roughly at this level since.61 In 2023, 25% of China’s gas demand was met with imports via liquified natural gas (LNG) shipments and 17% via pipeline.62 Overall, this is a far greater import dependency than the United States, which became a net exporter of crude oil in 2022.63 Though less severe than that of the European Union, which is 92% dependent on imports of crude oil and petroleum products, let alone Japan or South Korea, it means China must necessarily secure foreign supplies of oil and even natural gas for the foreseeable future.64
Notably, while China is not dependent on any one supplier for oil, it is often the most critical customer for any single exporter. For example, nearly all of Iran’s 2023 oil exports went to China, but it made up only around 10% of Chinese imports.65 While Saudi oil is 16% of Chinese imports, Chinese demand is 21% of Saudi exports.66 In 2023, Russian oil was 20% of Chinese imports, but Chinese demand is now over 40% of Russian exports.67 China is now the top customer for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia each. In 2021, China alone accounted for 60% of global LNG demand. These imports are diversified, with Australia, Qatar, and Malaysia being the most significant sources.68
Chinese oil imports are mainly transported by sea. As of 2016, 82% of oil imports arrived via the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, especially Middle Eastern oil imports.69 The majority of natural gas imports, via liquefied natural gas (LNG), are also supplied by sea. Smaller sea routes include routes from Australia, the Americas, and even Russia from the northeast, via the Arctic Sea route. In 2023, Russia shipped 1.5 million tons of crude oil to China through the Arctic, perhaps around 10 million barrels’ worth of oil.70 This is currently a negligible proportion of Chinese oil consumption, but one that Russia hopes to see grow. With the vast majority of trade still going through sea routes, China is at risk of a potentially very successful oil and gas embargo enforced by the U.S. Navy in case of a conflict, most likely over a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Despite this, there is no visible plan, explicit or implicit, to make China independent of seaborne oil and gas shipments. China does not lack oil or gas pipeline connections. Russian oil is exported to China primarily via the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. It can also be transported via the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline, which opened in 2005 and connects China to Kazakh oil fields near the Caspian Sea. The ESPO and Kazakh oil pipelines collectively have nearly 4 million barrels of oil capacity a day.71 There are also minor oil and gas pipelines connecting Myanmar to China.
China has four gas pipelines operating or under construction, connecting it to gas fields in Turkmenistan and transiting through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, with a combined capacity of 115 bcm annually.72 The most notable Russian gas pipeline is the “Power of Siberia” pipeline, which connects China to Russia’s eastern gas fields.73 It opened in 2019, provided 23 bcm of gas in 2023, and is projected to max out at 38 bcm by 2035. A second major pipeline, with a capacity of 50 bcm, is being developed to link China to the Yamal peninsula in central Siberia, where the majority of Russian gas is produced and which used to supply Europe with gas.74 Although Russia and China have agreed on the second Russian pipeline in principle, it is reportedly being delayed over disagreements over placement, with China preferring it not pass through Mongolia, which it views as politically unreliable.75
According to the Economics and Technology Research Institute, a think tank funded by PetroChina, the country will reach a peak oil demand of 18.5 million barrels per day in 2030.76 It also estimates that in 2040, this will decrease to 12.2 million barrels per day and that by 2060, this will fall to 5 million barrels a day.77 China’s oil output of about 4 million barrels per day has been roughly stable since 2010.78 Oil is critical to China’s transportation and industrial sector. Rather than greatly increasing production, Chinese leaders have sought to reduce oil dependency by reducing future demand, especially by promoting electrification, both in industry and through electric vehicle adoption.
In 2022, electricity was 28% of energy consumption in China, higher than 22% for the U.S. or 25% for France.79 But despite its dominance in electric vehicle manufacturing, in 2023, 65% of passenger vehicle sales in China were still standard internal combustion engine vehicles.80 Oil is also necessary to fuel China’s growing fleet of commercial vehicles, which are challenging to electrify. China is the largest market for new vehicles, with sales for passenger vehicles reaching 24 million in 2022 and set to grow still higher.81
Natural gas is less of a vital need to China in a wartime scenario than oil. It can be substituted by coal for heating needs and coal, renewables, or nuclear power for power supply. But it is relatively cheap, can be used as a substitute for oil as a fuel, and is a valuable electricity source to balance out intermittent renewables like solar photovoltaics, which have also rapidly grown in China. PetroChina projects that gas demand will peak at around 605 bcm by 2040.82
In total, there is 225 bcm in gas pipeline capacity already in place or planned.83 This, coupled with domestic production, would be enough to meet current needs but would not fully cover projected high demand up to 2040.84 At least half of oil consumption, meanwhile, relies on seaborne imports, and will continue to rely on them for the foreseeable future. To rapidly build out oil and gas pipelines to Russia, Central Asia, and even Iran, to secure as much cheap land-based oil and gas as possible, would not be out of the question for modern China. But it does not currently appear to be a priority. China’s oil and gas strategy, for now, assumes a future of peaceful globalization. Given the preoccupation of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping with maintaining social and political stability in China, which depends heavily on continued economic prosperity, this most likely suggests that China is not preparing for a major war over Taiwan anytime soon.
Xue, Yujie. “China to lead global oil demand growth in 2024 to feed reviving economy.” South China Morning Post, 12 January 2024, https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3248236/china-lead-global-oil-demand-growth-2024-fuel-economic-revival-consumption-heads-predicted-2027-peak.
Ritchie, Hannah, et al. “Explore Data on Energy.” Our World in Data, 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/energy#explore-data-on-energy.
Ritchie, Hannah, and Max Roser. “China: Energy Country Profile.” Our World in Data, 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/energy/country/china; Ritchie, Hannah, and Max Roser. “United States: Energy Country Profile.” Our World in Data, 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/energy/country/united-states.
Ibid.
Kreil, Erik. “United States produces more crude oil than any country, ever - U.S. Energy Information Administration.” EIA, 11 March 2024, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61545.
Pistilli, Melissa. “Top 10 Countries for Natural Gas Production (Updated 2024).” Investing News Network, 19 March 2024, https://investingnews.com/top-natural-gas-producers/.
“China's natural gas consumption up 7.6 pct in 2023.” The People's Republic of China, 11 February 2024, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/statistics/202402/11/content_WS65c88aacc6d0868f4e8e3f68.html.
“Natural gas – proved reserves - 2021 World Factbook Archive.” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/about/archives/2021/field/natural-gas-proved-reserves/country-comparison; “Crude oil – proved reserves - 2021 World Factbook Archive.” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/about/archives/2021/field/crude-oil-proved-reserves/country-comparison.
Textor, C. “China: natural gas production 2023.” Statista, 9 April 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/300455/china-natural-gas-production/.
“China: crude oil reserves by region 2016.” Statista, 3 January 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/279651/crude-oil-reserves-in-china-by-region/.
“Recoverable oil reserves top 1600 billion barrels, capable of warming the planet an extra 0.2°C by 2100.” Rystad Energy, 28 June 2023, https://www.rystadenergy.com/news/recoverable-oil-reserves-billion-barrels-warming-planet.
Ibid.
Rapier, Robert. “Global Leaders In Shale Oil And Gas Reserves.” Forbes, 12 February 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2024/02/12/global-leaders-in-shale-oil-and-gas-reserves/?sh=15f67ee829e2.
“Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources:.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2 September 2015, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/China_2013.pdf.
Nulimaimaiti, Mia. “China boasts bubbling crude discovery – oil that is, 107 million tonnes – in Henan province, adding fuel to energy-security drive.” South China Morning Post, 30 January 2024, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3250189/china-boasts-bubbling-crude-discovery-oil-107-million-tonnes-henan-province-adding-fuel-energy.
“Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources:.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2 September 2015, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/China_2013.pdf.
Ibid.
Venditti, Bruno. “The Largest Companies by Revenue: USA vs. China.” Visual Capitalist, 28 January 2024, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranking-the-largest-companies-by-revenue-usa-vs-china/.
“China Sits on the World’s Biggest Shale Gas Prize. Pumping It Out Is the Hard Part.” Bloomberg, 19 July 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-07-19/petrochina-sinopec-are-chasing-an-elusive-shale-boom?sref=ZqW0mZJf&embedded-checkout=true.
Thompson, Gavin. “There's still life in China's shale gas.” Wood Mackenzie, 28 April 2021, https://www.woodmac.com/news/opinion/theres-still-life-in-chinas-shale-gas/.
Jackson, Robert B et al. “The Depths of Hydraulic Fracturing and Accompanying Water Use Across the United States.” Environmental science & technology, vol. 49, no. 15, 2015, pp. 8969-76. PubMed, https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.5b01228.
Ma, Xinhua et al. “Deep shale gas in China: Geological characteristics and development strategies.” Energy Reports, vol. 7, 2021, pp. 1903-1914. ScienceDirect, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2021.03.043.
“Factbox: Domestic industry backs China's shale gas push.” Reuters, 21 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1JH0M9/.
Aizhu, Chen. “Stepping on the gas - China's home-built fracking boom.” Reuters, 21 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1JH0M0/.
Trefis Team. “Fracking Good News From China For Halliburton, Schlumberger And Baker Hughes.” Forbes, 9 August 2011, https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/07/19/fracking-good-news-from-china-for-halliburton-schlumberger-and-baker-hughes/?sh=15e09e4c230d.
Aizhu, Chen. “Stepping on the gas - China's home-built fracking boom.” Reuters, 21 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1JH0M0/.
Ma, Xinhua et al. “Deep shale gas in China: Geological characteristics and development strategies.” Energy Reports, vol. 7, 2021, pp. 1903-1914. ScienceDirect, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2021.03.043.
Xin, Zheng. “Domestic oil, gas production hits record in 2023.” China Daily, 10 January 2024, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202401/10/WS659dd505a3105f21a507b6f4.html.
Aizhu, Chen. “Chinese majors to struggle to extend shale gas boom beyond 2025.” Reuters, 26 January 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN29V0ZD/.
“US natural gas production by source, 2013-23 – Charts – Data & Statistics - IEA.” IEA, 26 July 2018, https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/us-natural-gas-production-by-source-2013-2023.
Liang, Cindy. “China's 2023 oil and gas output hits record high 390 mil mt oil equivalent.” S&P Global, 10 January 2024, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/lng/011024-chinas-2023-oil-and-gas-output-hits-record-high-390-mil-mt-oil-equivalent.
Aizhu, Chen. “Chinese majors to struggle to extend shale gas boom beyond 2025.” Reuters, 26 January 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN29V0ZD/.
Wei, Dong et al. “Where will China's shale gas industry go? A scenario analysis of socio-technical transition.” Energy Strategy Reviews, vol. 44, 2022, p. 100990. ScienceDirect, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2022.100990.
Aizhu, Chen. “Stepping on the gas - China's home-built fracking boom.” Reuters, 21 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1JH0M0/.
“Contested areas of South China Sea likely have few conventional oil and gas resources - U.S. Energy Information Administration.” EIA, 3 April 2013, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10651.
Liang, Cindy. “China's 2023 oil and gas output hits record high 390 mil mt oil equivalent.” S&P Global, 10 January 2024, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/lng/011024-chinas-2023-oil-and-gas-output-hits-record-high-390-mil-mt-oil-equivalent.
“China's oil production rises to 208 mln tons in 2023 - CCTV.” Reuters, 8 January 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-oil-production-rises-208-mln-tons-2023-cctv-2024-01-09/.
“CNOOC's Bohai overtakes Daqing as China's largest oil field.” Reuters, 10 January 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/cnoocs-bohai-overtakes-daqing-chinas-largest-oil-field-2022-01-10/.
Spegele, Brian. “China's Oil Industry Destined for Big Changes.” WSJ, 26 August 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-29500.
Blas, Javier. “The Most Overlooked Oil Production Boom Is in China.” Bloomberg, 9 July 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-07-10/china-s-oil-production-boom-shouldn-t-be-overlooked?sref=ZqW0mZJf.
“The Chinese Majors' Response to the Collapse in Global Oil Prices and the COVID-19 Pandemic.” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, November 2020, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Insight-79-The-Chinese-majors-responses-to-the-collapse-in-global-oil-prices-and-the-COVID-19-pandemic-an-upstream-perspective.pdf.
Liang, Cindy. “China's 2023 oil and gas output hits record high 390 mil mt oil equivalent.” S&P Global, 10 January 2024, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/lng/011024-chinas-2023-oil-and-gas-output-hits-record-high-390-mil-mt-oil-equivalent.
“Production cost breakdown per barrel of oil in top oil producing countries 2015.” Statista, 23 November 2015, https://www.statista.com/statistics/597669/cost-breakdown-of-producing-one-barrel-of-oil-in-the-worlds-leading-oil-producing-countries/.
“Crude oil processing in China hit a record high in 2023 - U.S. Energy Information Administration.” EIA, 4 March 2024, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61503.
Aizhu, Chen. “Explainer: China imposes growth limits on vast oil refining industry.” Reuters, 27 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-imposes-growth-limits-vast-oil-refining-industry-2023-10-27/.
Ibid.
Downs, Erica. “The Rise of China's Independent Refineries.” Center on Global Energy Policy, 2017, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/CGEPTheRiseofChinasIndependentRefineries917.pdf.
Ibid.
Calabrese, John. “Something's Brewing: China's “Teapot” Refineries and Middle East Oil Producers.” Middle East Institute, 19 May 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/somethings-brewing-chinas-teapot-refineries-and-middle-east-oil-producers.
“Russian Refineries Send Record Fuel-Oil Flows to China in May.” Bloomberg, 16 May 2023, .https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-17/russian-refineries-send-record-fuel-oil-flows-to-china-in-may?sref=ZqW0mZJf.
Downs, Erica. “The Rise of China's Independent Refineries.” Center on Global Energy Policy, 2017, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/CGEPTheRiseofChinasIndependentRefineries917.pdf.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cendrowski, Scott. “The Unusual Journey of China's Newest Oil Baron.” Fortune, 28 September 2016, https://fortune.com/2016/09/28/cefc-ye-jianming-40-under-40/.
Ibid.
AFP News. “Chinese oil baron hit by investigation: report.” Yahoo News, 28 February 2018, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/finance/news/chinese-oil-baron-hit-investigation-report-075852308--finance.html.
Aizhu, Chen. “China's legendary 'Crazy Yang' oil trader dies.” Reuters, 23 June 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0EZ0FE/.
“Oil, gas and coal import dependency in China, 2007-2019 – Charts – Data & Statistics - IEA.” IEA, 18 December 2020, https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/oil-gas-and-coal-import-dependency-in-china-2007-2019.
“China's oil dependence on imports sees drop.” The People's Republic of China, 24 February 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202202/24/content_WS6216e221c6d09c94e48a569e.html.
Zhang, Ziwei, et al. “Inside China's 2023 Natural Gas Development Report - Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University SIPA | CGEP %.” Center on Global Energy Policy, 11 September 2023, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/inside-chinas-2023-natural-gas-development-report/.
“Oil imports and exports - U.S. Energy Information Administration.” EIA, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php.
“Oil import dependency down to 91.7% in 2021 - Eurostat.” European Commission, 27 March 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230327-1.
“Iran's Petroleum Exports to China and U.S. Sanctions.” CRS Reports, 8 May 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12267.
Vassallo, Christopher. “China-Saudi RMB Settlement Will Insulate the Oil Trade From U.S. Sanctions.” Asia Society, 7 November 2023, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/china-saudi-rmb-settlement-will-insulate-oil-trade-us-sanctions.
“China imports record volumes of Russian oil in first half of 2023.” Financial Times, 19 July 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/dd0a0026-0972-45ed-9e62-1f0ea6c0ec58.
Robinson, Therese. “China Assumes Role of Swing Player With Surplus Natural Gas Inventories.” Natural Gas Intelligence, 14 September 2022, https://www.naturalgasintel.com/china-assumes-role-of-swing-player-with-surplus-natural-gas-inventories/.
Hsu, Sara. “China's Energy Insecurity Glaring In South China Sea Dispute.” Forbes, 2 September 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/09/02/china-energy-insecurity-south-china-sea-dispute/.
“China Pushes Northern Sea Route Transit Cargo to New Record.” High North News, 18 December 2023, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-pushes-northern-sea-route-transit-cargo-new-record.
Afanasiev, Vladimir. “Kazakhstan steps up drive to boost oil exports to China.” Upstream Online, 5 October 2023, https://www.upstreamonline.com/production/kazakhstan-steps-up-drive-to-boost-oil-exports-to-china/2-1-1530452.
“China's main import gas pipelines.” Reuters, 24 May 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-main-import-gas-pipelines-2023-05-24/.
Wilson, Tom. “Russia's planned gas pipeline to China hit by construction delay.” Financial Times, 27 January 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/f37f4b84-0d2c-4e7b-882c-3fb26822bb9c.
Ibid.
Pao, Jeff. “Power of Siberia 2 stuck on gas price, branch issues.” Asia Times, 20 January 2024, https://asiatimes.com/2024/01/power-of-siberia-2-stuck-on-gas-price-branch-issues/.
Slav, Irina, and Mamdouh Salameh. “Chinese Oil Demand Growth Is Set to Slow as Sales of EVs and LNG Trucks Climb | OilPrice.com.” Oil Price, 8 March 2024, https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Chinese-Oil-Demand-Growth-Is-Set-to-Slow-as-Sales-of-EVs-and-LNG-Trucks-Climb.html.
Ibid.
“Sinopec begins drilling Asia's deepest oil, gas well in Tarim basin.” World Oil, 5 May 2023, https://www.worldoil.com/news/2023/5/5/sinopec-begins-drilling-asia-s-deepest-oil-gas-well-in-tarim-basin/.
“Share of electricity in total final energy consumption.” Global Energy Statistical Yearbook, https://yearbook.enerdata.net/electricity/share-electricity-final-consumption.html.
Pontes, Jose. “33% Plugin Vehicle Market Share In China — February 2024 Sales Report.” Clean Technica, April 2024, https://cleantechnica.com/2024/03/31/33-plugin-vehicle-market-share-in-china-february-2024-sales-report/.
Thomala, Lai Lin. “China car sales 2010-2022.” Statista, 3 January 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/233743/vehicle-sales-in-china/.
Liang, Cindy, and Daisy Xu. “China's natural gas demand to peak in 2040 at 605.9 Bcm: ETRI.” S&P Global, 8 December 2023, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/lng/120823-chinas-natural-gas-demand-to-peak-in-2040-at-6059-bcm-etri.
“China's main import gas pipelines.” Reuters, 24 May 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-main-import-gas-pipelines-2023-05-24/.
Zhang, Ziwei, et al. “Inside China's 2023 Natural Gas Development Report - Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University SIPA | CGEP %.” Center on Global Energy Policy, 11 September 2023, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/inside-chinas-2023-natural-gas-development-report/.