Raytheon is Now Run Under the Portfolio Theory of the Firm
Raytheon is Now Run Under the Portfolio Theory of the Firm
The storied electronics manufacturer and defense contractor is now just one of a few distinct subsidiaries of a holding company. It is a dead player with no autonomy despite its unique specialties.
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RTX Corporation, with a revenue of $68 billion in 2023, is the world’s second-largest defense contractor behind Lockheed Martin. As of August 2024, at $155 billion, it also has the highest market capitalization (RTX) of any defense company.1 The company is the result of a 2020 merger between the U.S. defense contractor Raytheon, which primarily manufactures radar and missiles, and United Technologies Corporation (UTC), an industrial conglomerate that owned businesses related to aircraft engines and aircraft electronics i.e. avionics. The resulting company was called Raytheon Technologies Corporation until its rebranding as RTX Corporation in June 2023. Today, it is organized into three totally distinct “business units.” Collins Aerospace manufactures components and avionics for the aerospace industry, Pratt & Whitney manufactures aircraft engines for both military and commercial aircraft, and Raytheon is a defense-oriented business that primarily manufactures sensors and missiles for the U.S. armed forces.
Whereas Lockheed Martin is almost entirely an arms manufacturer and three-quarters of its revenue come from the Pentagon, RTX Corporation is more of a civilian manufacturer of high-tech components that happens to sell to the military. As of 2023, 43% of the company’s revenue was dependent on international sales.2 Collins Aerospace is 50% dependent on foreign sales, Pratt & Whitney is 38% dependent, and Raytheon is 23% dependent. Of the three businesses, Raytheon is the only one that could be considered a fully-fledged defense contractor, with 75% of its revenue directly provided by the U.S. government and nearly all the rest supplied by foreign military sales. In contrast, over 60% of income for the other two divisions is based on commercial sales.
The three subsidiaries are roughly equal in terms of revenue. However, Pratt & Whitney represents the majority of the company’s backlog, with $114 billion in engine orders as of January 2024.3 With 185,000 employees, 70% of whom are located in the U.S. and of whom 57,000 are engineers, RTX Corporation is one of the key corporations of the U.S. aerospace manufacturing industrial base, alongside Boeing. But it is not an industrial conglomerate built by a live player, but rather an amalgamation of many heterogeneous organizations and separate traditions of knowledge, recently collected together in a single corporate entity by career financiers, accountants, and managers operating on the theory that the ideal firm is like a financial portfolio with stably growing financial metrics.
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Raytheon Specializes in Radar, Lasers, and Guided Missiles
What primarily differentiates Raytheon from other major defense contractors is its focus on advanced radar and electronic systems. Today, the company produces the major radar systems allowing U.S. forces to detect aerial threats. This includes stationary radars at military installations, sea-based installations, and radars mounted on ships, trucks, and aircraft. Currently, the company’s largest contract is a $3.2 billion deal to manufacture 46 radar systems for the U.S. Navy.4 The second-largest is procuring transportable radars for the U.S. Army and the Saudi Arabian government.5
Radar is a foundational technology for modern military and commercial infrastructure. A radar emits electromagnetic radiation and detects the echo returned from the reflecting object. Modern radars can determine the trajectory and even the shape of the object.6 Radar systems have a frequency range between 30 megahertz and 300 gigahertz.7 Higher-frequency radars have less range and higher accuracy due to the relative shortness of their wavelengths. Different radar frequency bands are, therefore, tailored for various applications.8 Higher-frequency bands might be used for applications that demand greater accuracy, including high-resolution mapping or use in self-driving vehicles. If particular frequencies for radars can be matched by jamming systems, they can be disrupted.
The U.S. Space Force-run Global Positioning System (GPS) and equivalent systems like Russia’s GLONASS or Europe’s Galileo operate on similar technological principles to radars. GPS uses radio waves from a constellation of satellites and ground stations to accurately provide positioning information for a GPS receiver. Whereas radar is about detecting objects, GPS provides accurate locations. While Raytheon does not manufacture satellites, it does develop ground stations for GPS. Since 2010, it has been the primary contractor for the GPS Next Generation Operational Control Segment, or OCX, representing the large-scale replacement of GPS ground control systems for the entire U.S. military.
The progenitor to OCX, the Operational Control Segment (OCS), had been run by Boeing and Lockheed Martin from 1996 to 2012.9 It is a network of control stations and ground antennas, with the central control station located at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado. With this ground-based infrastructure, modern GPS is possible. OCX was supposed to be fully operational by 2016, but due to delays, it is not expected to be deployed until mid-2025.10 The Pentagon threatened to terminate it in 2015 following significant delays and cost overruns but ultimately decided to continue funding it.11 The delay in rolling out OCX means that, of the 32 major GPS satellites used by the U.S. Space Force, only seventeen can use the latest signals or have access to the latest anti-jamming technology.12 The cost of the system, initially set at $4 billion, has increased to over $7 billion.13 In 2022, Raytheon paid $10 million to a former employee who was demoted for notifying management that his superiors asked him to falsify test data related to OCX.14 The delayed rollout of the updated infrastructure by Raytheon highlights significant failures and inefficiencies in the U.S. defense industrial base, which are not limited to individual components and weapons systems but to infrastructure essential for running virtually every electronic system in the military.
Raytheon is also the largest producer of guided missiles in the world. Raytheon jointly manufactures the Javelin anti-tank missile with Lockheed Martin; this missile is one of many the U.S. and its allies supply to Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia. Both companies are also now the only major manufacturers of torpedoes, with Raytheon’s Mark 54 torpedo being designed for anti-submarine warfare and launched from aircraft and surface ships.15 As with most programs, these Raytheon systems rely on components manufactured from other defense contractors. For example, the Mark 54’s acoustic sensors are produced by Northrop Grumman.16 Raytheon also produces air-to-air missiles, with the capacity to produce around 1200 medium-range air-to-air missiles a year.17 The company is also the primary contractor for the GPS-guided Excalibur artillery shells.18 These shells have considerably higher accuracy and effective range but cost up to $100,000 per shell, compared to $3000 for a conventional shell.19 Raytheon has also received funding to develop hypersonic cruise missiles but so far has not fielded them.20
Much of Raytheon’s missile production is directed towards anti-air systems. It is the primary producer of portable anti-air Stinger missiles. Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, demand from the Ukrainian armed forces led Raytheon to restart production of the system, bringing in retirees in the process. Raytheon’s most notable missile system is the Patriot air and missile defense system, which is the cornerstone for mid-range missile and air defense for the U.S. and its allies. The company manufactures the ground system, radar, and several missile variants, while Lockheed Martin manufactures other variants of the missiles used.21 Raytheon’s expertise in missile defense infrastructure has also made it a key partner to the Israeli government for its “Iron Dome” national air defense system.
These missile defense systems are technically impressive, but there are concerns that their cost per missile is becoming uneconomical, given the declining cost of airborne explosives through drone warfare. For instance, the Iranian Shahed “kamikaze drones”—which function more like guided missiles—while slow and easy to shoot down, cost only $50,000 per missile.22 An alternative technology to expensive interceptors for missile defense are “directed energy weapons” or powerful lasers. Raytheon is the most prominent corporate developer of directed energy weapons for the U.S. government. The nascent field is split roughly between high-energy lasers (HEL) and high-power microwave (HPM) systems. The former fire targeted laser beams to destroy single targets, while the latter emit high-frequency microwaves designed to hit multiple targets. The area of effect for a laser is measured in millimeters, while for a microwave weapon it is measured in tens of meters.23
Lasers have been touted for military applications for decades. The Earth's curvature limits them by only being able to fire in straight lines and, therefore, can only hit something within their line of sight; their ammunition is limited only by a consistent electric power source. Low-power lasers can be used for non-lethal purposes. They can induce nausea or burning sensations. Between 2002 and 2007, Raytheon was contracted to develop and test the Active Denial System (ADS), a vehicle-mounted microwave that could penetrate 1/64th of a human’s skin and cause intolerable burning sensations.24 The system was deployed to Afghanistan but was never used, and it was withdrawn in 2010.25
Raytheon has since developed more powerful microwave and laser weapons to destroy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) i.e. drones. The U.S. Air Force is testing its High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS) to destroy drones.26 The system is being mounted onto both U.S. and British military vehicles.27 While promising, major technological bottlenecks hold back directed energy systems. Pinpoint tracking of incoming threats at extended ranges for lasers is challenging due to clouds and rain and could be made more so by enemies deploying shrapnel or debris in the air.28 Beam control is another issue. A laser has to be pinpointed onto a single point of a projectile for a certain amount of time to destroy it, but when it hits, vibrations can cause jittering, which limits its penetrating power. Another major constraint is maximizing the power of the laser while limiting the size and expense of the system.29
Pratt & Whitney is One of a Handful of Aircraft Engine Manufacturers
Pratt & Whitney serves both the commercial passenger and military aircraft market. In 2023, 48% of its revenue came from Airbus, with much of the rest likely coming from Boeing.30 The company is also the primary manufacturer of the F135 turbofan engine used by Lockheed Martin’s F-35 joint strike fighter program, and before that, it produced the F119 engine utilized by the F-22 Raptor.31 This makes the subsidiary a critical supplier to the program underpinning the Pentagon’s plans for future U.S. airpower. Pratt & Whitney is one of a handful of major aircraft engine manufacturers that can build and export the most significant engines for commercial aircraft; the others are General Electric Aerospace, British Rolls-Royce, and French Safran. While it nominally competes with these companies, it operated a joint venture with General Electric called Engine Alliance, which produced the GP7200 turbofan engine used for the Airbus A380 jumbo jets.32
From 2020 to 2029, Pratt & Whitney is expected to deliver 19% of military aircraft engines worldwide, with 70% of them being F135 engines for Lockheed Martin’s F-35.33 Pratt & Whitney and Collins Aerospace rely on Chinese suppliers and have a significant presence there. Pratt & Whitney has 2000 employees in China, primarily to maintain the engines of Airbus and Boeing aircraft operating there.34 The flagship Chinese aircraft manufacturer Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) buys systems from Collins Aerospace and Pratt & Whitney for its domestically-produced jetliners, though not engines, which it gets from General Electric and Safran instead. While the Chinese state-owned defense aerospace company AVIC is developing its own domestically-built turbofan engine, the CJ-1000A, it is not expected to be commercialized until at least 2030.35
Pratt & Whitney’s headquarters and historic manufacturing facilities are in East Hartford, Connecticut, but the company’s operations are increasingly dispersed today in the U.S. and abroad, with new facilities opening in recent years in Oklahoma, Florida, and even Singapore.36 The company has shown some similar manufacturing failings at its U.S. facilities as Boeing. The company lost close to $5 billion after having to recall and inspect hundreds of engines due to a manufacturing error.37 In 2015, the company expanded capacity at its subsidiary HMI in Clayville, New York, where the company makes powdered nickel to manufacture components for the PW100G engines. During the ramp-up, a contaminant was mistakenly introduced into the powder, which inspection failed to detect during that time.38
Workers used contaminated powder between 2015 and 2021.39 This failure potentially degrades engine components and performance, resulting in potential safety issues and unplanned maintenance work across hundreds of aircraft. As a result, airlines have had to schedule sending hundreds of aircraft to Pratt & Whitney facilities, with every shop inspection taking up to 300 days.40 This is the most high-profile failure, but there have been others. In 2021, dozens of Boeing 777 aircraft were grounded following mid-air malfunctions from PW4000 engines.41 Should the company’s manufacturing discipline degrade further as Boeing’s has, this would put the functionality of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 jet fighter in question, as well as of both Boeing and Airbus jetliners, although the latter two could much more easily switch engine makers than Lockheed Martin.
Many Companies Bundled Into One Portfolio
Both RTX Corporation and its constituent parts are organizational patchworks with far-flung origins. Today, Collins Aerospace is the primary supplier of avionics, flight control systems, the nacelles that house aircraft engines, and components to the U.S. aerospace industry, alongside Honeywell. Its current incarnation was created in 2018 when UTC acquired the avionics contractor Rockwell Collins and merged it with its own aerospace division, UTC Aerospace Systems. Rockwell Collins was spun off as an independent company in 2001, from its parent Rockwell International, which originally acquired the Collins Radio Company in 1973, which itself was originally founded to make radios for the U.S. military in 1933.
Pratt & Whitney, meanwhile, spent nearly all its history since its founding in 1925 as a subsidiary of United Aircraft Corporation, which became UTC in 1975. Raytheon is the third major constituent part of RTX Corporation. It was cofounded in 1922 by the legendary American engineer and WWII-era science administrator Vannevar Bush in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Raytheon was the largest U.S. producer of magnetrons, a key component for radios, by the end of World War II, and in 1945 filed the first patent for the microwave.42 Raytheon subsequently built its own microwaves and licensed the technology to other suppliers.43 During the 1990s, Raytheon acquired other defense businesses, including the defense electronics business of Texas Instruments and the remaining assets of Hughes Aircraft, a legacy of the prominent billionaire and aviator Howard Hughes.44 During this time, Raytheon also divested its non-defense businesses, including Amana, a company focused on home appliances.45
RTX Corporation’s executive chairman is 63-year-old Greg Hayes, the former CEO of UTC from 2014 to 2020 and the CEO of RTX until May 2024.46 Hayes, an accountant by training, had spent two decades in management positions at UTC, including holding the position of chief financial officer.47 Upon the merger with Raytheon, Hayes became CEO, while Raytheon’s CEO, Thomas Kennedy, briefly became executive chairman before retiring. In 2022, Hayes moved the headquarters of the new company from Waltham, Massachusetts to Arlington, Virginia, in the suburbs of Washington, D.C.48 The move was intended to increase immediate access to government decision-makers and follows a recent trend of defense contractors including Boeing and Bechtel moving their executive leadership close to the U.S. capital, in these cases from Chicago and San Francisco, respectively.
The 2020 merger between UTC and Raytheon was driven by Greg Hayes, from his position as CEO of UTC, and represented the endpoint of a long-running reorganization of UTC from a diversified conglomerate to an aerospace and defense company. As a separate company, UTC was a disparate industrial conglomerate that was roughly split between the aerospace division, which included Pratt & Whitney, and two commercial companies: Otis, the well-known manufacturer of elevators, and Carrier, a manufacturer of refrigeration and air conditioning systems. The latter two were spun off due to activist pressure from Bill Ackman, head of Pershing Square Capital Management, and Dan Loeb of the hedge fund Third Point. In 2018, both investors called for breaking up UTC into its component businesses, arguing that these functional divisions were trading at a discount due to the perceived inefficiencies of conglomerates.49
Meanwhile, the same year, Hayes bought the avionics company Rockwell Collins for $30 billion, which became Collins Aerospace.50 Shortly thereafter, UTC and Raytheon announced they would merge. The merger was explicitly one of convenience and risk mitigation through diversification. According to the two companies’ CEOs, the “resilience” of creating a company whose business was 50% domestic, 50% international, 50% defense, and 50% commercial was a driving factor.51 This would help the new corporation avoid cyclical financial downturns from either defense or commercial contracts through sheer size and redundancy. Since UTC was focused on the civilian side and Raytheon on the defense side, and neither built “platforms” i.e. finished high-profile products, but rather just components, the companies would be purely complementary.52 There would be no merging of operational units, just corporate leadership and administration, in an “integration lite.”53
The company’s new president and CEO since May 2024, 50-year-old Christopher Calio, is a lawyer who served as Hayes’ chief of staff at UTC.54 Calio joined UTC in 2005, presumably not long after acquiring his law degree and MBA from the University of Connecticut, and served in multiple legal positions at the company before eventually becoming chief operating officer of RTX Corporation. The corporation’s chief digital officer and head of the supply chains similarly came from United Technologies. The chief technology officer previously spent his career at General Electric, while the head of government relations, Jeff Shockey, spent most of his career at Boeing.55
Much like other major defense contractors, RTX Corporation’s central business units have their own presidents. Shane Geddy, the head of Pratt & Whitney, initially joined from General Electric Aerospace, the company’s chief competitor. Stephen Trimm, the head of Collins Aerospace, had been with the business for years. Both Trimm and Geddy are non-technical executives who graduated from business schools. Phil Jasper, the current head of Raytheon, had previously spent his entire career at Collins Aerospace. The leadership of RTX Corporation is, therefore, almost entirely made up of UTC veterans, the larger of the two groups, despite the 2020 merger being nominally one of equals.56
The reorganization of such unlike companies into one based primarily if not solely on top-level financial metrics is reminiscent of constant corporate restructurings in other industries where dead players predominate. For example, pharmaceutical companies like AstraZeneca are effectively holding companies for rapidly-changing portfolios of drugs determined by CEOs who are trying to stitch together the ideal basket of profitable assets at any given time, and whose primary tool to do so is acquiring, divesting, or merging with other companies, not long-term strategy based on technical innovation, scientific traditions of knowledge, or industrial efficiency. This theory of the firm as a portfolio of potentially if not even preferably unrelated assets turns firms into financial products aimed at appealing to passive investors, rather than mission-driven organizations seeking to raise production and lower prices in order to reap profit at great risk but potentially great reward.
Raytheon is Emblematic of the Centrally Unplanned U.S. Defense Industrial Base
The merger between UTC and Raytheon in 2020 invited scrutiny from the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), which has extensive powers to enforce antitrust laws on potential mergers. When mergers or acquisitions in the defense industry are proposed, the Justice Department is responsible for scrutinizing the merger, and the Department of Defense (DoD) is invited to give its own analysis. The Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, an advisor to the Secretary of Defense, can scrutinize a potential deal if it is believed to leave a particular market with only a single supplier. They can subsequently call for divestments of specific businesses or oppose the merger altogether. Ultimately, the DoJ accepted the merger, and the DoD did not oppose it.57
The DoJ review did, however, conclude that the overlap between the businesses regarding airborne radios, military GPS, and electro-optical or infrared sensors could lead to a single supplier. As a result, Raytheon had to divest its airborne radios business, and UTC was required to divest its GPS and optics business. The British BAE Systems bought Raytheon’s airborne radios business and the GPS business for $2 billion, while UTC’s electro-optics division was also divested and acquired by the Arka Group.58 These small-scale divestments are common in any defense merger. As part of UTC’s acquisition of Rockwell Collins in 2018, the DoJ demanded it divest its actuation and flight control businesses to the French engine maker Safran, a notable competitor to Pratt & Whitney.59
Personnel at the Department of Justice have a theory about preventing monopolies. Activist investors and executives trained in the legal and academic business traditions share a theory about maximizing shareholder value and targeting other financial metrics. But the Department of Defense, which is the institution charged with planning the U.S.’ military posture, seems to offer little to no input on the specific corporate structures and reorganizations of its defense contractors, despite these companies manufacturing all of the equipment needed for the U.S. military to function at all. Only after the Defense Authorization Act of 2024 was it made necessary for companies and the DoJ to provide the DoD with information linked to major mergers.60 A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated in 2023 that, from 2018 to 2022, of the roughly 400 mergers and acquisitions occurring each year, only around 40 even received assessment from Pentagon officials.61
This is in large part because the intrinsically subservient relationship between defense contractors and the Pentagon means that, as long as specific “programs” for specific pieces of equipment are retained across mergers and divestments, the Pentagon does not really care who the CEO or shareholders of a company technically are or how often they change. The power imbalance between the Pentagon and its contractors is intended to ensure that weapons programs, any number of which could be considered essential to national security, are not cut or endangered unilaterally by business executives for business reasons. In this way, there is a natural complementarity between the Pentagon’s preferences and the portfolio theory of the firm subscribed to by financiers and accountants.
This dynamic takes the planning and decision-making power in the defense industrial base out of the hands of defense contractors and puts it exclusively in the hands of the Pentagon. But, having taken this power, if the Pentagon does not engage in planning, then there is simply no planning whatsoever. The load-bearing parts of the defense industry, like specific manufacturing plants or traditions of knowledge in engineering, continue on autopilot even while financiers rearrange titles and administrative divisions to create new companies, on paper, with better financial metrics. This does not result in immediate catastrophe but also eliminates the possibility for live players to successfully plan the defense industrial base to respond to likely long-term scenarios and changes in technological, industrial, or geopolitical conditions.
The Justice Department’s acceptance of consolidation with the caveat of rejecting any possible narrow monopoly means business consolidation, but specifically not in any domain where consolidation would improve efficiency or accelerate research. Even when not forced to divest, major defense companies increasingly sell assets that do not neatly fit their new portfolio or have lower margins. For example, Rocketdyne is one of only two solid rocket motor manufacturers, meaning its failures impact the entire U.S. armed forces. North American Aviation founded it, after which it was bought by Rockwell International, sold to Boeing, subsequently incorporated into Pratt & Whitney, sold again to GenCorp, merged with another supplier, Aerojet, and sold again to the military communications company L3 Harris. In 2022, it failed to deliver rocket motors for a Raytheon naval defense missile on time.62 Rocketdyne was owned by Rockwell Collins and Pratt & Whitney and is now an unreliable supplier to their successor.
The defense industry thus enjoys neither the benefits of vertical integration and scale nor the benefits of Darwinian free market competition. The resulting inefficiencies are excused and continually enabled by generous financing from Congress and little to no effective auditing of the Defense Department.63 Meanwhile, the officials in charge of various businesses are interchangeable managers who move seamlessly between rival companies. Shane Geddy, the head of Pratt & Whitney, spent most of his career at the company’s chief rival, GE Aerospace. Mark Mills, a significant program developer for Raytheon’s SPY-6 radar systems, had previously spent nearly sixteen years at Northrop Grumman, the company’s chief competitor in military radar production.64
Official DoD policy, based on an internal 2022 report, is that it needs to strengthen merger oversight and support new entrants and small businesses in the defense supply chain.65 This shows that the Pentagon understands it has a problem with its defense industrial planning, but it is still drawing the wrong conclusions about how to solve it. Should RTX Corporation encounter financial difficulties in the future, it is likely to be pressured by the Pentagon to divest Raytheon or other defense-related businesses, or otherwise reorganize itself.
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“Largest defense contractors by market cap.” Largest Companies by Market Cap, https://companiesmarketcap.com/defense-contractors/largest-companies-by-market-cap/.
“2023 annual report.” RTX, 2023,
https://investors.rtx.com/static-files/2870406d-da57-4e95-8048-2c043e03dc8a.
Ibid.
Bernal, Kyle. “What Are The Top Raytheon Government Contracts?” Potomac Officers Club, 6 January 2023, https://potomacofficersclub.com/articles/what-are-the-top-raytheon-government-contracts/.
“Zahid Industries to produce Raytheon power units for missile defense radar.” Defense Arabia, 18 January 2023, https://english.defensearabia.com/zahid-industries-to-produce-raytheon-power-units-for-missile-defense-radar/.
Merrill, Skolnik. “Radar Handbook.” Library of Congress, 1990, https://microsite.geo.uzh.ch/rsl-documents/research/SARlab/GMTILiterature/PDF/Skolnik90.pdf.
Henneberger, Marion. “On the same wavelength – - RADAR-BLOG - Ein Technikjournal von InnoSenT.” RADAR-BLOG, https://radar-blog.innosent.de/en/on-the-same-wavelength/.
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“GPS Operational Control Segment > Los Angeles Air Force Base > Display.” Los Angeles Air Force Base, 2018, https://www.losangeles.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/343722/gps-operational-control-segment/.
Khalil, Jesse. “GPS OCX delays continue.” GPS World, 16 February 2024, https://www.gpsworld.com/gps-ocx-delays-continue/.
“OCX Faces Crucial Pentagon Review, Congressional Broadside,” Inside GNSS, 29 October 2015, https://insidegnss.com/ocx-faces-crucial-pentagon-review-congressional-broadside/
Decker, Audrey. “Long-overdue GPS ground stations delayed by pandemic, Chinese hardware.” Defense One, 8 August 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2023/08/long-overdue-gps-ground-stations-delayed-pandemic-chinese-hardware/389220/.
“GPS MODERNIZATION: Space Force Should Reassess Requirements for Satellites and Handheld Devices.” Government Accountability Office, 5 June 2023,
Capaccio, Anthony, “ Raytheon Wires $1 Million to Whistleblower Over Fake GPS Test Results for Air Force,” Bloomberg, 31 October 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-31/whistleblower-collects-1-million-from-raytheon-over-gps-project-for-air-force?sref=ZqW0mZJf
“MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo and High-Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability (HAAWC).” U.S. Navy, 2017, https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2017/navy/2017mk54.pdf?ver=2019-08-19-113708-880.
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Shoaib, Alia. “Ukraine Hails US Excalibur Artillery Shell for Its Pinpoint Accuracy.” Business Insider, 15 April 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-us-excalibur-artillery-shell-accuracy-2023-4.
Peck, Michael. “Cost of Key US Weapons Like Artillery Shells for Ukraine Is Soaring.” Business Insider, 16 March 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/cost-key-us-weapons-artillery-shells-for-ukraine-is-soaring-2024-3.
Losey, Stephen. “Air Force budget backs Raytheon hypersonic, no Lockheed missile funds.” Defense News, 12 March 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2024/03/12/air-force-budget-backs-raytheon-hypersonic-no-lockheed-missile-funds/.
“PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense System for Ukraine.” CRS Reports, 18 January 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12297.
Rubin, Uzi. “Russia's Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile | Royal United Services Institute.” Royal United Services Institute, 13 January 2023, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile.
“Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 22 August 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R46925.pdf.
“Active Denial Technology Fact Sheet.” Department of Defense, May 2016, https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Fact_Sheets/ADT_Fact_Sheet_May_2016.pdf.
“U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for Congress.” CRS Reports, 12 February 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45098.
“Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 22 August 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R46925.pdf.
“NP Aerospace progresses Raytheon HELWS on Wolfhound,” Advance, 19 April 2024. https://www.adsadvance.co.uk/np-aerospace-progresses-raytheon-helws-on-wolfhound.html
“Reasons to Doubt Laser Missile Defense.” Arms Control Association, 14 May 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018-05-14/reasons-doubt-laser-missile-defense.
Ibid.
“2023 annual report.” RTX, 2023,
https://investors.rtx.com/static-files/2870406d-da57-4e95-8048-2c043e03dc8a.
Decker, Audrey. “Pentagon to give Pratt & Whitney sole-source F-35 engine upgrade work.” Defense One, 29 November 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2023/11/pentagon-give-pratt-whitney-sole-source-f-35-engine-upgrade-work/392359/.
Pozzi, James. “Future Of The GP7200 Engine.” Aviation Week, 10 May 2022, https://aviationweek.com/mro/aircraft-propulsion/future-gp7200-engine.
“Top Military Engine Manufacturers By Deliveries/Retirements 2020-2029.” Aviation Week, 22 January 2020, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/z/top-military-engine-manufacturers-deliveriesretirements-2020-2029.
Pfeifer, Sylvia. “'We can de-risk but not decouple' from China, says Raytheon chief.” Financial Times, 19 June 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/d0b94966-d6fa-4042-a918-37e71eb7282e.
Zenglein, Max. “The sky is the limit: China's rise as a transportation superpower challenges the EU.” Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), 26 October 2023, https://merics.org/en/report/sky-limit-chinas-rise-transportation-superpower-challenges-eu.
Michael Puffer, “Pratt & Whitney eyes new 313K-square-foot office building in East Hartford,” Hartford Business Journal, April 9, 2024, https://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/pratt-whitney-eyes-new-313k-square-foot-office-building-in-east-hartford
John A. Tirpak, “F135 Parts with Contaminated Metal Will Be Replaced at Depot, JPO Says,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, October 27, 2023, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/f135-parts-contaminated-metal-replaced-depot/
Pratyush Thakur, “Explainer: RTX engine snag puts spotlight on aerospace quality issues,” Reuters, September 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/rtx-engine-snag-puts-spotlight-aerospace-quality-issues-2023-09-14/
“The Problem with Pratt & Whitney’s PW1100G Engines on the A320neo Family,” Cranky Flier, September 26, 2023, https://crankyflier.com/2023/09/26/the-problem-with-pratt-whitneys-pw1100g-engines-on-the-a320neo-family/
Ibid.
Jon Hemmerdinger, “Design and inspection problems preceded 2021 PW4000 failure as nine more cracked blades found: NTSB,” Flight Global, September 9, 2023, https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/design-and-inspection-problems-preceded-2021-pw4000-failure-as-nine-more-cracked-blades-found-ntsb/154874.article
“October 8, 1945: First Patent for the Microwave.” American Physical Society, https://www.aps.org/archives/publications/apsnews/201510/physicshistory.cfm.
Ackerman, Evan, “A Brief History of the Microwave Oven Where the “radar” in Raytheon’s Radarange came from.” IEEE Spectrum, 30 September 2016,
https://spectrum.ieee.org/a-brief-history-of-the-microwave-oven
Mintz, John. “Raytheon to buy Hughes from GM for $9.5 billion.” Washington Post, 16 January 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1997/01/17/raytheon-to-buy-hughes-from-gm-for-95-billion/bbfa92aa-06d0-49c1-9076-82984cbf521a/
“Raytheon sells Amana, other appliance units for $750 million.” South Coast Today, 15 July 1997, https://eu.southcoasttoday.com/story/business/1997/07/15/raytheon-sells-amana-other-appliance/50611766007/.
“RTX names Christopher T. Calio to succeed Gregory J. Hayes as CEO.” PR Newswire, 14 December 2023, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rtx-names-christopher-t-calio-to-succeed-gregory-j-hayes-as-ceo-302016146.html.
“Gregory J. Hayes.” RTX,
https://www.rtx.com/who-we-are/corporate-governance/gregory-j-hayes.
Weisgerber, Marcus. “Raytheon Technologies to Move HQ from Massachusetts to Northern Virginia.” Defense One, 7 June 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2022/06/raytheon-technologies-move-hq-massachusetts-northern-virginia/367849/.
Deveau, Scott. “Ackman Joins Loeb in Push to Break United Technologies Apart.” Bloomberg, 15 May 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-15/ackman-makes-pitch-to-break-united-technologies-into-three-parts?sref=ZqW0mZJf
Bellamy, Woodrow. “UTC Completes Acquisition of Rockwell Collins.” Avionics International, 27 November 2018, https://www.aviationtoday.com/2018/11/27/utc-completes-acquisition-rockwell-collins/.
Mehta, Aaron. “Raytheon's Tom Kennedy and UTC's Greg Hayes on why they are uniting the companies.” Defense News, 11 June 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2019/06/11/raytheons-tom-kennedy-and-utcs-greg-hayes-on-why-they-are-uniting-the-companies/.
Ibid.
Bogaisky, Jeremy. “Why The United Technologies-Raytheon Merger Makes Sense.” Forbes, 10 June 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2019/06/09/a-merger-of-united-technologies-and-raytheon-makes-sense/.
“Christopher T. Calio.” RTX,
https://www.rtx.com/who-we-are/our-leadership/christopher-calio.
“Jeff Shockey.” RTX, https://www.rtx.com/who-we-are/our-leadership/jeff-shockey.
Thompson, Lauren, “Five Reasons Raytheon Technologies Is Destined To Dominate Aerospace & Defense,” Forbes, 2 April, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2020/04/02/five-reasons-raytheon-technologies-is-destined-to-dominate-aerospace--defense/?sh=5204f9793719
Weisgerber, Marcus. “Pentagon Sees ‘No Major Concerns’ With Raytheon-United Technologies Merger.” Defense One, 26 August 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2019/08/pentagon-sees-no-major-concerns-raytheon-united-technologies-merger/159452/
Jewett, Rachel. “AMERGINT Closes on Acquisition of Raytheon Technologies' Space-Based Optics Business.” Via Satellite, 2 September 2020, https://www.satellitetoday.com/finance/2020/09/02/amergint-closes-on-acquisition-of-raytheon-technologies-space-based-optics-business/.
“Safran to acquire Collins Aerospace's actuation and flight control business.” Safran, 21 July 2023, https://www.safran-group.com/pressroom/safran-acquire-collins-aerospace-s-actuation-and-flight-control-business-2023-07-21.
“Antitrust Review of Defense Mergers: DOD Gets its Own Production of Parties' Materials in HSR Merger Reviews.” WilmerHale, 8 February 2024, https://www.wilmerhale.com/insights/client-alerts/20240208-antitrust-review-of-defense-mergers-dod-gets-its-own-production-of-parties-materials-in-hsr-merger-reviews.
“DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: DOD Needs Better Insight into Risks from Mergers and Acquisitions.” Government Accountability Office, 17 October 2023, https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24106129.pdf.
Carpaccio, Anthony. “RTX Slow to Deliver Missiles to Defend US Carriers From China,” Bloomberg, 23 January 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-23/defense-giant-rtx-behind-schedule-on-missile-to-defend-us-carriers-from-china?sref=ZqW0mZJf
Robertson, Noah. “Pentagon fails sixth audit, with number of passing grades stagnant.” Defense News, 15 November 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/11/16/pentagon-fails-sixth-audit-with-number-of-passing-grades-stagnant/.
“Mike Mills,” Linkedin, https://www.linkedin.com/in/mike-mills-77b0423b/
“State of Competition in the Defense Industrial Base.” Department of Defense, 15 February 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2934955/state-of-competition-in-the-defense-industrial-bas.