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With a population just under 10 million people, Hungary is a mid-sized country in Central Europe. Since 2010, Hungary has been ruled by currently 61-year-old Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his political party Fidesz. Orbán is the longest-serving head of government of any country in the European Union (EU) and the second-longest-serving of any country in NATO, behind Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Whereas tangible change to government institutions and policies via electoral politics is rare in most heavily bureaucratized European countries like France or Germany, Orbán has used his repeated electoral victories to mold Hungarian institutions, not just in government but also in media, higher education, and business. While Hungary is neither a geopolitical nor economic power, Orbán has proved to be a contrarian thinker among European leaders: he has seemingly turned his country into an independent force in diplomacy and foreign policy, as well as taken a strident stance against EU immigration policy and launched a vaunted domestic government policy and financial incentive program to raise Hungarian birth rates.
Like Poland and Estonia, Hungary was a communist country under the influence of Moscow between the end of World War II and 1990. Hungary joined NATO in 1999 and, in 2004, it joined the EU alongside Poland and eight other Southern and Eastern European countries. The country is landlocked and ethnically homogeneous, with an overwhelmingly Hungarian population and a Romani minority of uncertain size, somewhere between 3-8% of the population.1 Hungary is a centralized country, with political, economic, and cultural life dominated by the capital city of Budapest, whose metropolitan area contains around 3 million people and which is the most disproportionately demographically dominant capital city of any country in Europe.2
Orbán and Fidesz overwhelmingly won Hungary’s 2022 elections for the fourth time in a row and will remain in office until the next elections in 2026. But despite almost fifteen years of continuous and consolidated rule by Orbán's Fidesz, which is arguably the most populist and socially conservative ruling party in Europe, Hungary’s economic, demographic, geopolitical, and cultural trajectories have not yet significantly changed compared to its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary is a key case study in how lasting political power can be achieved in a contemporary liberal democracy, but also the perhaps surprisingly stark limitations of populist and conservative conventional wisdom to create meaningfully different outcomes in modern governance.
Hungary is a Manufacturing Economy Plugged Into German Industry
Hungary is an export-oriented economy. As of 2023, exports of goods and services are equivalent to 81.2% of Hungarian GDP.3 Such a high proportion is common to many small and mid-sized European countries that trade extensively with their many neighbors, both within and without the European Union. Hungary has a diversified industrial export base. The largest category of exports in 2023 was electrical and electronic equipment at 26%, followed by automobiles at 17%, and other machinery at 14%.4 Hungary also exports pharmaceuticals, plastics, rubber, furniture, chemicals, optical equipment, and much more. This means manufacturing is the cornerstone of the Hungarian economy and has held at about 15-20% of GDP since 1995.5 This makes Hungary about as manufacturing-oriented as Poland or Germany.
As of 2022, just under 90% of Hungary’s exports are to countries in Europe and Central Asia.6 Just like Poland and most other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary has a special economic relationship with Germany.7 Germany is by far the single largest Hungarian export partner, with 25.2% of Hungarian exports, followed by Italy at 5.7% and Romania at 5.3%.8 Imports are a similar picture: Germany is Hungary’s largest import partner at 21.1%, followed by Austria at a relatively distant 7.3%.9 Hungary, however, is just about 2% of German exports and imports. Notably, the share of Chinese imports for Hungary is just 6.7%. This is a much lower share than Hungary’s peers: in Poland, China’s import share is 13.1% and in Czechia it is nearly 19%.10 Hungary is not a crucial export or import partner to any other country.
Hungary is a significant automobile manufacturer. In 2023, it produced just over 500,000 personal vehicles, up from about 100,000 in 2003 and about as many as or more than much more populous countries like Romania, Morocco, or Poland.11 Hungary lacks internationally-known auto brands of its own, but acts as a low-labor-cost manufacturing hub for the German car companies Audi, Opel, Mercedes-Benz, and BMW, as well as Japan’s Suzuki.12 The Hungarian auto industry employs over 100,000 people.13 This would leave Hungary open to disruption by U.S. and Chinese electric vehicles. Tesla once reportedly considered opening a plant in Hungary but chose Germany instead.14 Orbán’s government has however recently wisely courted Chinese manufacturers: as of October 2024 both China’s top battery maker CATL and its top electric vehicle manufacturer BYD are building large factories in Hungary.15
Hungary is also a significant regional hub for electronics manufacturing, with so-called “electronics manufacturing services” (EMS) companies like Taiwan’s Foxconn, Germany’s Zollner, and U.S. firms like Flextronics, National Instruments, and Jabil having a presence in the country.16 These companies do not manufacture semiconductors, but might package or assemble them, as well as produce or assemble electronic components for everything from hair dryers to laptops.17
While the economies of other export-oriented countries like South Korea or Sweden are essentially built around vast conglomerates led by family dynasties like Hyundai or the Wallenberg family, Hungary, like Poland, lacks any such industrial empires, with the main unit of Hungarian industry instead being the small or medium-sized business: 69% of the Hungarian workforce is employed by “small or medium-sized” enterprises employing fewer than 250 people each in total.18 The largest Hungarian companies by revenue and market capitalization are either former state-owned enterprises or subsidiaries of foreign corporations, not any new firms led by live players. For example, the largest Hungarian company by revenue and profit is MOL, an energy company put together from parts of the socialist economy in 1991 and which has since acquired the formerly Croatian and Slovak state-owned energy companies.19
The local subsidiaries of German companies Audi, Bosch, E.ON, Mercedes-Benz, and Uniper also rank highly on the list of largest Hungarian companies by revenue, as does the Hungarian subsidiary of Samsung.20 The most valuable company in the country, OTP Bank, is Hungary’s largest bank—and also notably a major bank in neighboring countries like Serbia and Ukraine—and was also a former state-owned enterprise under communism.21 Just five Hungarian companies have market capitalizations above $1 billion: OTP Bank, MOL, the local subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom (i.e. T-Mobile), another bank, and Gedeon Richter, a former state-owned pharmaceutical manufacturer.22
Hungary’s economy is in substantial part effectively a subcomponent of the German economy. Over 70% of “large” enterprises in Hungary i.e. those employing over 250 people in total, are foreign-owned.23 These firms employ 25% of the Hungarian workforce but produce “about 50%” of the “added value generated locally.”24 Foreign investment has played a major role in Hungary’s economic growth, with the total stock of foreign inward direct investment generally equaling a larger proportion of GDP in Hungary than in Hungary’s neighbors since the early 1990s.25 In 2023, the figure stood at equivalent to 56% of Hungarian GDP, compared to 45% for Slovakia, 41% for Poland, and 36% for Romania.26 In 2021, the two largest foreign investors in Hungary were Germany and Austria.27
Whereas Poland’s economy has been fueled by domestic coal mining, Hungary’s has been powered by nuclear energy. Just under 50% of Hungarian electricity in 2023 came from nuclear power, the third-highest percentage in the world after France and Slovakia.28 Hungary has four nuclear reactors at the Paks power plant in southern Hungary which generate this electricity.29 Since 2008, Hungary has greatly reduced its reliance on natural gas and coal for electricity generation. Gas is now just 21% of generation, coal another 8%, and solar power has rapidly grown from nothing to 18% as of 2023.30
Nonetheless, Hungary is overwhelmingly reliant on imports of Russian oil and natural gas for heating and transportation, which come to Hungary via pipelines transiting Ukraine. Recent figures put the dependence on Russian oil and gas imports at well over half of all oil and gas imports.31 Hungary has never had a substantial advantage in electricity prices over its neighbors, and today its electricity prices are comparable to or somewhat lower than Poland’s.32
Hungary’s relations with China have until very recently been superficial. Between 2000 and 2023, Hungary received €7.2 billion in Chinese investment, more than any other Eastern European country but still well below the sums China invested in most Western and Northern European countries.33 While many European countries have explicitly restricted or agreed to restrict the use of Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei’s technology, Hungary has not.34 Hungary has been an early and consistent supporter of China’s Belt and Road foreign investment initiative, and was the first EU country to approve China’s COVID-19 vaccine in 2021.35
Hungary’s economic relationship with China may however be on the cusp of becoming much more substantive. In December 2023, China’s top automaker BYD announced it would build the first “state-of-the-art” Chinese car factory in Europe in Hungary.36 The plant’s expected capacity of 200,000 vehicles per year is nearly half of Hungary’s existing vehicle production.37 The upcoming CATL battery plant, meanwhile, is expected to have capacity to produce batteries for 1 million electric vehicles per year.38 It would be the second CATL plant in Europe, with the first built in Germany. Hungary rocketed from 1% of Chinese investment in Europe in 2021 to an incredible 44% in 2023.39 In 2023, China made up 58% of all foreign investment in Hungary, a stark turnaround from years of top foreign investment coming from Germany and other Western countries.40
Integration into Chinese industry may become a point of divergence between Hungary and its neighbors going forward, which would be a significant payoff for Orbán’s years of diplomacy with China. In 2024, CATL notably pulled out of plans to build facilities in Poland, citing among other things an inadequate supply of electricity.41 Some Chinese automakers like Leapmotor are however building plants in Poland.42 The Chinese automakers SAIC and Chery are reported to be scouting for locations to build their own European plants, with Spain and the United Kingdom respectively being first choices, but with Hungary and Czechia also under consideration.43 Orbán has said part of his grand strategy for Hungary is to remain a manufacturing hub in the EU open to the rising economies of Asia, like China, which he sees as providing an economic alternative to the West for the first time in five hundred years.44
Hungary’s economy is not globally relevant nor has its economic growth since the fall of communism been exceptional. With a nominal GDP of $212 billion, Hungary’s economy is smaller than that of Greece or Portugal.45 Whether measuring by nominal or purchasing-power-adjusted GDP per capita, Hungary is in line with its neighbors. At just over $22,000 nominally in 2023, it is equivalent to Poland but below Slovenia or Czechia.46 Adjusted for inflation and purchasing power, Hungary’s GDP per capita has grown by 115% since 1990, compared to 235% for Poland and 74% for Czechia.47 Like Poland and its neighbors in Central Europe, Hungary is an economically egalitarian society as measured by the Gini index, which measures income inequality.48
Viktor Orbán Consolidated Power By Empowering Parliament
Orbán is a skilled live player in politics. Whereas many political movements fizzle out despite winning elections, Orbán turned his first electoral supermajority in 2010 into an institutionalized base of power that regularly changes outcomes by passing sweeping laws—and changing the details if there is pushback—and is capable of neutralizing both foreign and domestic opponents, or funding both foreign and domestic allies. One of Orbán's very first moves in power in 2010 was to extend Hungarian citizenship, and thus voting rights, to the roughly 2 million ethnic Hungarians who live as minorities in neighboring countries.49
These numerous diaspora Hungarians have overwhelmingly voted for Fidesz, at rates above 90% and even above 95%, since 2014.50 Fidesz has somewhat gerrymandered voting districts, but it has, more importantly, remained extremely popular, increasing its share of the popular vote each time since 2014 with very high turnout of 70%.51 With many Fidesz-passed laws requiring a parliamentary “qualified majority” of two-thirds to amend, many of Orbán's reforms would be likely to last long-term even if Fidesz disappeared overnight.
Viktor Orbán grew up in small towns outside of Budapest; his father was an agricultural engineer.52 Despite a provincial background, he is a lawyer by training, having studied at Hungary’s prestigious Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. Similar to many of Poland’s post-communist leaders, Orbán's political career began as a young student anti-communist activist in the 1980s, where Orbán met many of his future political allies such as Hungarian Speaker of the National Assembly László Kövér and one-time Orbán chief of staff, Constitutional Court judge, and current Government Commissioner for Universities István Stumpf. Orbán's master’s degree thesis was on Poland’s anti-communist Solidarity movement and quoted its leaders first-hand; Orbán had social ties to Poland’s anti-communist activists.53
Orbán founded Fidesz in 1988 and the party won 9% of the vote in Hungary’s first free elections in 1990, putting Orbán in parliament at the age of just 26. The Hungarian-American investor George Soros was a major financial backer of Fidesz in its early years, due to his interest in transitioning the communist world to liberal democracy, and even funded a scholarship for Orbán to study at the University of Oxford.54 Orbán designed Fidesz to be Hungary’s premier center-right party in the early 1990s, appealing to the “patriotic, property-owning middle class,” and both Orbán and Fidesz have hewed to this ideological position since.55 The party broadly advocates socially conservative, fiscally conservative, and Hungarian nationalist positions.
Although Orbán served a term as Prime Minister of Hungary from 1998 to 2002, the bedrock of Orbán's institutional reforms are the legal and constitutional changes implemented during the start of his second tenure between 2010 and 2013. Fidesz won a supermajority of parliamentary seats—more than two-thirds—in the 2010 election, giving it the power to amend the constitution, which it subsequently did, in addition to adopting over 600 new laws.56
These changes included enshrining in law mostly symbolic, socially conservative notions such as that marriage is exclusively between a man and a woman, that life begins at conception, and that homelessness is a criminal offense against public order. The government also established a new media regulator with the power to grant or revoke broadcasting licenses and fine media outlets, as well as fired over 1000 employees of the state broadcaster MTVA.57 But the most important changes regarded the balance of power between the Constitutional Court—Hungary’s supreme court—and unicameral parliament.
Orbán's government enacted a number of judicial reforms: a parliamentary-appointed official was given the power to appoint and transfer judges; the retirement age of judges was lowered from 70 to 62 years old, forcing nearly 300 judges to retire early, before being amended to allow them back in lower-ranking positions if they so chose; the nomination process for members of the Constitutional Court was altered to give the parliamentary majority the power to nominate; the court was expanded from 11 to 15 judges and the new positions filled by parliament; the court’s jurisdiction to rule on the basis of human rights was removed; the ability for any citizen—or non-governmental organization—to petition for constitutional reviews was removed; and the Constitutional Court was barred from referring to its own rulings from before January 1, 2012.58
These reforms drew substantial criticism at the time from the European Union, U.S. government, German government, academics, and activist groups, which led to some initially more ambitious provisions being moderated or walked back.59 But, by and large, Orbán's government succeeded at neutralizing the power of the Constitutional Court over parliament. The judicial and constitutional reforms were a direct response to the court initially striking down many of the Fidesz-run parliament’s new statutes; the reforms essentially reasserted parliamentary power over the court. Notably, whereas the Hungarian parliament is an institution in various forms arguably dating back to the Middle Ages, the Constitutional Court was established only in 1989 in an attempt to set up a Western-style democracy with separation of powers, and was effectively the first time the principle of “judicial independence” had been introduced to Hungary.60
Between 2017 and 2019, the Hungarian government forced Central European University (CEU) out of the country by amending laws regulating university accreditation and hiring. CEU was founded in Budapest in 1991 by George Soros and funded with one of the largest financial endowments in Eastern Europe. The Hungarian government alleged the university’s ability to offer joint U.S.-Hungarian degrees was an unfair advantage over Hungarian universities that could not offer U.S.-accredited degrees.61 Although the EU courts eventually ruled against the law in 2020, the university had already almost entirely moved to Vienna in 2019.62
In 2021, the Hungarian parliament passed a law transferring control of eleven state universities—reportedly half of the total—to foundations with boards seating many Orbán political allies, and endowed these foundations with hundreds of millions of euros in stock in companies like MOL and Gedeon Richter, as well as pledged over €3 billion in EU funds for the “modernization” of universities.63 As of October 2024, the EU is withholding funds to 21 Hungarian universities controlled by such foundations in response and Orbán's government is proposing to amend its laws to bar government ministers, lawmakers, and mayors from taking such positions to end the dispute.64 Also in 2021, the parliament passed a law to build a €2 billion Budapest campus of China’s prestigious Fudan University, based in Shanghai, which would be the first Chinese university in the EU.65 The plan was tabled following protests in Budapest and currently has an unclear status. Orbán's goal is to give Hungary’s youth a conservative education and create a future conservative Hungarian elite.66
Notably, Orbán's government has embarked on a campaign to export its conservative ideology and politics to Europe and the United States. In 2017, John O’Sullivan, a British journalist and former speechwriter for Margaret Thatcher, was hired to be the president of the Danube Institute, a Hungarian think tank founded in 2013 and which receives state funding. In 2021, it made the American conservative author Rod Dreher a visiting fellow.67 The American academic Gladden Pappin, who founded the quarterly journal American Affairs in 2017, is now the president of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, also a state-funded think tank.68 Among other minor outlets, the Hungarian government also funded the magazine The European Conservative with €4.3 million in 2021.69 American journalist Tucker Carlson interviewed Viktor Orbán in English in 2023.70 Funding from the government goes through institutions such as the Mathias Corvinus Collegium, a private college, and the Batthyány Lajos Foundation.
International events aimed at a conservative audience have also sprung up, such as the biennial Budapest Demographic Summit and, in 2024, a Hungarian spinoff of the American Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC).71 These events have drawn major government figures from both Hungary and the wider Western world, including former U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. In October 2024, it was also reported that the Hungarian bank MBH Bank had extended tens of millions of euros in loans to right-wing parties across Europe including France’s National Rally, Spain’s Vox, and Austria’s Freedom Party.72
MBH Bank’s “primary owner” besides the Hungarian state is reportedly Lőrinc Mészáros, a former schoolmate and childhood friend of Orbán's, and one of Hungary’s handful of billionaires.73 While some of the wealthiest Hungarians like long-time OTP Bank CEO Sándor Csányi or businessman Zsolt Felcsuti appear to have made their fortunes without substantial coordination with the government, a number of Hungary’s wealthiest people are close allies of Orbán's, some of whose wealth was acquired in large part just by preferential reception of government contracts.74 Mészáros is the main example, rocketing from relative obscurity to become the wealthiest person in Hungary in 2023.75 Meanwhile, Lajos Simicska, another wealthy former schoolmate of Orbán's, retreated from public view and apparently fell off the list of wealthiest Hungarians following a public break with Orbán in 2015.76 Orbán's son-in-law, businessman István Tiborcz, also ranks among Hungary’s wealthiest people.77
Orbán’s charm offensive and funding of wider conservative political and intellectual life seem to be intended to influence the direction of the European Union, which he does not want to leave and has said must be “fixed.”78 The EU has been key to Hungary’s economic growth both as a common market and as a source of funds: receiving an estimated €4.2 billion, in 2021 Hungary was the third-largest net beneficiary of EU funds after Poland and Greece.79 EU membership is very popular in Hungary despite many battles between Orbán and the EU over immigration, foreign policy, education, and more, which have in recent years increasingly resulted in the EU trying to levy fines on or withhold funds from Hungary.80
Orbán’s Hungary has not shied away from using its national veto power in EU institutions to stall, block, or extract concessions from EU policies.81 This has been more effective than attempts to build coalitions in the notoriously weak and divided European Parliament, which plays a subservient role in EU policy compared to the European Commission and European Council. Fidesz was in fact kicked out of the European Parliament’s main center-right group in 2021.82 Orbán opposes EU membership for Ukraine, but supports it for Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia; this position would give Hungary the most new allies in the EU.83
Orbán wishes the EU to become more of an association of sovereign nation-states and less of an implicit federal government for Europe. He has said Europe needs integration in defense, trade, and technology rather than politics, or it will remain an “open-air museum.”84 In the long term, it is difficult to see how Orbán’s preferences and those of Brussels can be reconciled, and Brussels is already experienced in ignoring and circumventing the wishes of its member states. Brussels ultimately holds the upper hand over Orbán, since Hungary is far more economically and financially dependent on the rest of Europe than Brussels or even Germany are on Hungary.
Conservative Victory Has Not Transformed Hungary
Orbán and Fidesz’ consolidation of power has been frequently decried by Western academics, government officials, and journalists as damaging Hungarian democracy or making Orbán a dictatorial strongman. This critique fails to account for the democratic nature of Orbán's power base. More importantly, despite nearly fifteen years in government, Orbán has not radically altered Hungarian society, but primarily used his influence to make domestically-popular policy changes that are mostly well within the norms set by other liberal democracies and developed countries.
For example, Orbán's government abolished progressive taxation and introduced a flat tax. As of 2024, Hungary has some of the lowest income tax rates in Europe: a flat personal income tax rate of 15%, a capital gains tax rate of 15%, and a corporate income tax rate of just 9%—although the highest value-added tax (VAT) i.e. sales tax in Europe at 27%.85 The government has fought a long-running legal battle with both European and Hungarian courts to legally privilege Hungary’s traditional churches and religions above small and new religious groups.86 In 2021, the government made it illegal to “promote homosexuality” to minors, perhaps its most radical action compared to other EU countries, although one that has since been imitated by Bulgaria.87 Hungary is in theory obligated to adopt the euro currency, but Orbán has indicated this will not happen anytime soon and there is no official target date for adoption. But this is also the position of Poland and of Czechia, who are also yet to adopt the euro.
Even on immigration, perhaps the most serious political flashpoint between Orbán, the EU, and Western Europe, it is unclear that Hungary’s policy has substantially diverged from its neighbors. During the 2015 illegal migrant crisis in Europe, Hungary built a comprehensive barrier on its borders with Croatia and Serbia. In 2022, Poland began building such a wall too, on its border with Belarus, also to prevent illegal migrants. For years, Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia—the so-called Visegrad Group of countries—fought the EU’s attempts to impose mandatory relocations of migrants to every EU country, among other political battles over immigration. As of 2024, this battle has seemingly ended with the EU voting to offer each country the choice of accepting migrants or paying a €20,000 fine for each rejected migrant.88 Hungary voted against, as did Poland—despite a new and more socially liberal government under Prime Minister Donald Tusk—while Slovakia and Czechia abstained.
In 2023, Hungary received the fewest applications for asylum of all EU countries, only 30, compared to 410 for Slovakia, 1400 for Czechia, 9475 for Poland.89 While Hungary has certainly achieved the lowest figure, the figures for all Eastern European countries pale in comparison to the over 100,000 applications received by Italy, Spain, and France, let alone the 351,000 received by Germany. But compared to the countries of Western and Northern Europe, with their generous social welfare systems, no country in Eastern Europe is a prime destination for migrants, nor has any country opened its doors to mass immigration the way other countries have for decades.
In recent years, Hungary and other Central European countries have expanded work permit programs for guest workers from outside the EU. Hungary announced it would cap guest worker visas at 65,000 for 2024, from fifteen approved countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucuses, Central Asia, and Latin America, as well as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam.90 Hungary's list notably excludes India and Ukraine. This quiet turn towards immigration paired with conservative rhetoric isn’t surprising, even though it clashes with Orbán's statements that “there can be no question of population decline being compensated for by migration.”91
Since the fall of communism circa 1990, not a single Eastern European country has seen population growth comparable to that of Western and Northern European countries, and almost every Eastern European country has seen large declines in population due to emigration, aging, and in some cases war. Hungary lost 6.8% of its population between 1990 and 2022, worse than Poland or Russia, but significantly better than the roughly 20-25% lost by Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, or the Baltic states, let alone Ukraine. This demographic decline is perhaps the single largest economic problem facing Eastern European countries.
Because of these severe demographic problems, the Hungarian government’s most vaunted policy program has been its attempt to raise birth rates through a series of financial incentives.92 Hungary’s fertility policies vary significantly in both how generous they are and their likely effect. Parents receive income tax deductions according to the number of children they have, up to roughly €550 per child per month if there are three or more children.93 This amounts to a reduction of taxable income of about €20,000 per year, about the annual average earnings in Hungary, implying an average Hungarian couple with a working father and stay-at-home mother would pay no income tax. Mothers of four or more kids pay no personal income tax, but this apparently does not extend to their husbands or partners who are more likely to be breadwinners anyway.94 At just 15%, income taxes are also already low for everyone in Hungary; nor do these deductions remove the additional 18.5% social security tax.95
For buying or constructing a home, married couples with children are eligible for grants of up to roughly €25,000 for couples with three or more children.96 Couples intending to have children may receive a 25-year loan of up to roughly €24,000 at a fixed 3% interest rate.97 The VAT tax on newly-built homes is reduced from 27% to 5%.98 Families with three or more children can receive roughly €6500 for the purchase of a large personal vehicle to seat seven people, but this would defray only a fraction of the cost of a new large car, with new Toyotas retailing for well over €30,000 at least.99 Women under 40 marrying for the first time can receive a low-interest loan of roughly €25,000.100 There are a raft of other minor payments for getting married and reduced costs for services like vaccinations and childcare.101 The Hungarian government is today reportedly spending 5% of GDP on these incentives, over €10 billion annually.102
As of October 2024, there is no appreciable difference in the fertility rate of Hungary compared to neighboring countries. According to the World Bank, Hungary’s fertility rate did recover from a record low of 1.2 in 2011 to 1.6 in 2021.103 But its fertility rate in 2024 is expected to drop to 1.39.104 Meanwhile, neighboring countries without such ambitious programs have both recovered from their own all-time lows and have seen increased fertility since 2010 too. Czechia, for example, reached a low of 1.1 in 1999, but recovered to surpass Hungary in 2007 and reached a recent high of 1.8 in 2021 before dropping again—its expected 2024 fertility rate of 1.35 is statistically identical to Hungary’s.105
Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Romania have also all had effectively the same or higher fertility as Hungary over the last fifteen years—for 2024 all of these countries are expected to see slightly higher fertility than Hungary.106 The exception to this rule has been Poland, which is expected to see the lowest fertility in Europe in 2024 at 1.12. Where Hungary has diverged is its marriage rate: between 2010 and 2019, Hungary’s marriage rate doubled and the country now has the highest marriage rate in Europe.107
Whether this ultimately proves to be a leading indicator for future fertility remains to be seen; total fertility rate is a synthetic measure that is prone to swings from shifts in the timing of births among women in the childbearing generation. Regardless of the effect on fertility, the marriage rate itself is likely seen as a victory by ideological conservatives. Orbán himself has said Hungary’s progress in fertility has “stalled” despite aiming for being “demographically self-sustaining” by 2035.108
While at odds with the preferred social policies of the United States, Germany, or France, it cannot be said that Orbán's government pursued a radical foreign policy. Under a policy sometimes called “Eastern Opening,” Orbán has nurtured cordial personal and diplomatic relations with China, Russia, Turkey, Israel, and the Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, the latter of which has seen Hungary even become an observer member of the Organization of Turkic States, a concession to a strain of Hungarian nationalism that sees Hungarians as descendants of Attila the Hun or other steppe peoples.109 Orbán and long-time Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have reportedly known each other since 2005 and Netanyahu reportedly brokered Orbán's introduction to U.S. President Donald Trump.110 These relations have largely remained only diplomatic, however, as Hungary’s economy remains overwhelmingly tied to Germany and the EU. The 2022 shares of Hungarian imports and exports to the U.S., Turkey, and Israel are nearly identical to those in 2010, while the Chinese and Russian shares have actually declined.111
Despite frequent sensationalist claims in the news media that Orbán is an ally to Russian President Vladimir Putin, in reality it is difficult to argue that Hungary has ever done anything to materially and substantially further Russian interests. Hungary’s one nuclear power facility at Paks is expected to be expanded in 2025 by the Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom, under a much-delayed contract negotiated by Orbán's government.112 But like many nuclear reactors built during communism, the reactor is of a Soviet design; Slovakia has also contracted with Rosatom to build new nuclear reactors, although Poland and Czechia have turned to U.S. and South Korean companies. Choosing to contract with Rosatom is the default choice.
Hungary has claimed “neutrality” in the Ukraine war—also China’s official position—and argues it should not be obligated to further Western involvement in the war on Ukraine’s behalf, since the war damages Hungarian and European interests.113 Hungary has delayed aid to Ukraine from the EU, reportedly blocking 41% of EU resolutions on Ukraine.114 It also delayed Sweden’s accession to NATO and opted out of NATO military aid to Ukraine, but did not block aid as it theoretically could have.115
In previous years, Hungary also did not veto EU sanctions on Russia, which it theoretically could have.116 As of October 2024, Hungary is blocking EU reimbursements to national governments for military aid already given to Ukraine.117 These actions are better interpreted as Orbán driving a hard bargain to further Hungarian interests at the expense of Ukraine and other governments. For example, Hungary has succeeded in preventing much-needed Russian gas supplies transiting Ukraine from being cut off and it has also succeeded at pressuring Ukraine not to impose mandatory Ukrainian language education on the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Orbán has criticized Poland’s enthusiastically pro-American and pro-Ukrainian foreign policy since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but predicts Poland will return to primarily coordinating with the Visegrad countries in the future.118
In the economy, foreign policy, demographics, and other domains, Hungary is surprisingly then not on a measurably different trajectory so far from its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe. In a way, Orbán and Fidesz have paid all the costs of deviating from Western consensus, but reaped few of the potential rewards yet. Though Hungary is a relatively small country on the global stage, it is possible to envision strategies with which Orbán's government could have radically altered its trajectory.
A more ambitious nuclear energy program could have seen Hungary outcompete its neighbors on electricity prices and therefore industrial growth early on. New exceptional export-oriented companies could have been built in cooperation with live players, whether through new domestic champions taking advantage of Hungary’s industrial expertise, creating a favorable regulatory and business environment for software startups like Estonia, or perhaps common Visegrad funding for defense technology outside the auspices of the EU or NATO. To offset population loss, Hungary could have encouraged immigration from neighboring countries, including of its Hungarian minorities abroad, and perhaps even turned Budapest into the de facto capital of Central and Eastern Europe—while Hungary is less populous than Czechia or Poland, Budapest’s metropolitan area is roughly as populous as Warsaw’s.
To his credit, Orbán is aware of the importance of manufacturing, nuclear energy, defense spending, technology investment, and national champion firms, all of which he cites as parts of what he calls his long-term grand strategy for Hungary and for Europe, which he says the government began drafting after 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine and a decade of “national course building” in Hungary.119 But many other proposals are likely to conflict, perhaps deeply, with nationalist and conservative sentiment in Hungary. Orbán has said cultural sovereignty must be based on a middle class linked to Christianity and Hungary’s villages and towns, and that “we will not create megacities.”120 He considers the Hungarian minorities abroad part of his political community.
Perhaps the most significant impediment to a uniquely better Hungarian future is thus the populist conservatism of Fidesz itself, which limits both the government’s ideological and strategic imagination as well as the political capital to take novel actions. Contrary to the hopes of conservatives the world over, Hungary’s resolute implementation of conservative conventional wisdom has not fixed the birth rate, has not led to an economic or technological renaissance, and, most importantly, has not succeeded at winning the hearts and minds of Hungary’s urban youth and intellectuals—Fidesz has lost the Budapest mayoral elections twice in a row since 2019, a pattern also seen in neighboring countries. Hungary is so far unlikely to prove an exception to the culturally liberalizing and secularizing forces that can be seen even in deeply conservative countries like Russia or South Korea, and are perhaps transmitted as much through Netflix and social media as through Soros-funded nonprofits, or are perhaps really driven by deeper and more obscure forces relating to the nature of industrial society itself.121
Viktor Orbán is only 61 years old and has been active in politics since he was a young man. There are no term limits for his position. The main threat to Orbán is electoral. In October 2024, a new center-right opposition party led by a former Fidesz member polled higher than Fidesz for the first time; in the 2024 European Parliament elections, it took 30% of the vote, coming in second place to Fidesz’ 45%.122 Nonetheless, Orbán could well remain in power as late as the 2040s, when he would be the current age of Donald Trump. This means that, as of 2024, Hungary is possibly only halfway through the leadership tenure of Viktor Orbán. There is still plenty of time for Orbán and Fidesz to alter Hungary’s trajectory. But to do so will require not only deviating from the consensus of Western liberals, but also deviating from the consensus of conservatives, likely in ways that will at first be viewed as strange, confusing, or disloyal, like Hungary’s courting of China. To go beyond implementing received wisdom, it will be necessary to rethink entirely the fundamentals, goals, and strategy of Hungary’s society and economy.
According to the World Bank. See here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=true
According to TradingEconomics. See here: https://tradingeconomics.com/hungary/exports-by-category
According to the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution database. See here: https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/HUN/Year/LTST/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/all/
Anders Sundell, “Visualizing Countries Grouped by Their Largest Trading Partner (1960-2020),” Visual Capitalist, February 11, 2022, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/biggest-trade-partner-of-each-country-1960-2020/
According to OICA production figures. See here: https://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/2023-statistics/
According to the Hungarian government. See here: https://doha.mfa.gov.hu/eng/page/main-industries-of-hungary
Ibid.
Vivien Rima, “This is where Tesla’s products could be built: Hungarian city is the Top 1,” Daily News Hungary, January 19, 2023, https://dailynewshungary.com/this-is-where-teslas-product-could-be-built-hungarian-city-is-the-top-1/
Eric Reguly, “How China turned Hungary into its European electric-vehicle bridgehead,” The Globe and Mail, October 15, 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-how-china-turned-hungary-into-its-european-electric-vehicle-bridgehead/
Ibid.
Nilay Patel, “Flex manufactures everything from hair dryers to the Mac Pro — what’s next?,” The Verge, May 25, 2021, https://www.theverge.com/22451309/flex-revathi-advaithi-interview-decoder-manufacturing-covid-19
Zsuzsanna Sarkadi, “The share of foreign-owned companies on the Hungarian market,” Company Formation Blog, accessed November 1, 2024, https://companyformation.hu/blog/the-share-of-foreign-owned-companies-on-the-hungarian-market/
Flora Medve, “Largest companies in Hungary in 2022, by revenue,” Statista, May 28, 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1375778/hungary-leading-companies-by-revenue/
Ibid.
Frank Brown, “Hungary’s Largest Companies by market capitalization, 2024,” CEOWorld Magazine, February 19, 2024, https://ceoworld.biz/2024/02/19/hungarys-largest-companies-by-market-capitalization-2024/
Ibid.
Zsuzsanna Sarkadi, “The share of foreign-owned companies on the Hungarian market,” Company Formation Blog, accessed November 1, 2024, https://companyformation.hu/blog/the-share-of-foreign-owned-companies-on-the-hungarian-market/
Ibid.
According to the UNCTADstat database. See here: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.FdiFlowsStock
Ibid.
“2024 Investment Climate Statements: Hungary,” U.S. State Department, accessed November 2, 2024, https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/hungary/
According to the IAEA. See here: https://pris.iaea.org/pris/worldstatistics/nuclearshareofelectricitygeneration.aspx
“Nuclear Power in Hungary,” World Nuclear Association, April 2, 2024, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/hungary
According to Our World in Data. See here: https://ourworldindata.org/energy/country/hungary#what-sources-does-the-country-get-its-electricity-from
Georgina Mccartney, “Hungary says EU not doing enough to end Russian gas dependence,” Reuters, September 18, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/hungary-says-eu-not-doing-enough-end-russian-gas-dependence-2024-09-18/
According to the UK government figures. See here: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/international-industrial-energy-prices
C. Textor, “Cumulative value of completed foreign direct investment (FDI) transactions from China in EU-27 and UK between 2000 and 2023, by country,” Statista, October 9, 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1244460/china-cumulative-foreign-direct-investment-to-eu-by-country/
Mark Anthony Gubagaras, “5G Focus: Dutch rollouts; AT&T's network; Europe's approach to Huawei,” S&P Global, July 28, 2020, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/5g-focus-dutch-rollouts-at-t-s-network-europe-s-approach-to-huawei-59610077
Stuart Lau, “Hungary becomes first EU country to authorize Chinese coronavirus vaccine,” Politico, January 29, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-becomes-first-eu-country-to-authorize-chinese-coronavirus-vaccine/
Paul McVeigh, “BYD picks Hungary for its first European car plant,” Automotive News Europe, December 21, 2023, https://www.autonews.com/automakers/byd-make-evs-and-batteries-europe-hungary/
Eric Reguly, “How China turned Hungary into its European electric-vehicle bridgehead,” The Globe and Mail, October 15, 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-how-china-turned-hungary-into-its-european-electric-vehicle-bridgehead/
Ibid.
Tianyi Xiao, “China-Hungary Bilateral Relations: Trade and Investment Outlook,” China Briefing, June 27, 2024, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-hungary-bilateral-relations-trade-and-investment-outlook/
“Investment Withdrawal Hits Polish Economy: CATL Follows Intel’s Lead,” Poland Daily 24, February 20, 2024, https://polanddaily24.com/investment-withdrawal-hits-polish-economy-catl-follows-intels-lead/business-tech/37111
“Exclusive: China's Leapmotor to build EVs at Stellantis' Polish plant, sources say,” Reuters, March 22, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/chinas-leapmotor-start-production-small-ev-polish-stellantis-plant-2024-03-22/
Theo Leggett, “Chinese giant Chery could build cars in UK,” BBC, September 8, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c74jgk1kw87o; “Another Chinese Car Manufacturer Could Follow BYD to Hungary,” Hungary Today, July 22, 2024, https://hungarytoday.hu/another-chinese-car-manufacturer-could-follow-byd-to-hungary/
See Viktor Orbán’s July 2024 lecture at the 33rd Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp here: https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-33rd-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp/
“Pandora’s passport,” The Economist, June 3, 2010, https://www.economist.com/europe/2010/06/03/pandoras-passport
“A wild gerrymander makes Hungary’s Fidesz party hard to dislodge,” The Economist, April 2, 2022, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/04/02/a-wild-gerrymander-makes-hungarys-fidesz-party-hard-to-dislodge
Paul Kirby and Nick Thorpe, “Who is Viktor Orban, Hungarian PM with 14-year grip on power?”, BBC News, February 13, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67832416
Neil Buckley and Andrew Byrne, “The rise and rise of Viktor Orban,” Financial Times, January 25, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/dda50a3e-0095-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
David Herszenhorn, “Hungary’s Freudian political fight: Orbán vs Soros,” Politico, April 27, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungarys-freudian-political-fight-orban-vs-soros/
Neil Buckley and Andrew Byrne, “The rise and rise of Viktor Orban,” Financial Times, January 25, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/dda50a3e-0095-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
“Wrong Direction on Rights,” Human Rights Watch, May 16, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws
Ibid.
Ibid.
“Comments on the Fifth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary,” Hungarian Helsinki Committee, September 18, 2013, https://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/NGO_comments_on_the_5th_Amendment_to_the_Fundamental_Law_October2013.pdf
Szente Z. Stepping Into the Same River Twice? Judicial Independence in Old and New Authoritarianism. German Law Journal. 2021;22(7):1316-1326. doi:10.1017/glj.2021.69
“CEU Responds to Proposed Amendments in Hungarian Higher Education Law,” Central European University, March 28, 2017, https://www.ceu.edu/article/2017-03-28/ceu-responds-proposed-amendments-hungarian-higher-education-law
Nick Thorpe, “Hungary broke EU law by forcing out university, says European Court,” BBC News, October 6, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54433398
“Hungary’s Orban extends dominance through university reform,” CNN, April 27, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/27/europe/hungary-orban-university-reform-intl/index.html; Benjamin Novak, “Hungary Transfers 11 Universities to Foundations Led by Orban Allies,” The New York Times, April 27, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/world/europe/hungary-universities-orban.html
Csongor Koromi, “Hungary offers olive branch to Brussels in bid to reenter Erasmus scheme,” Politico, October 2, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-brussels-universities-erasmus-banning-ministers-grants-public-trusts/
Akos Keller-Alant and Reid Standish, “What's Next For China's Fudan University Campus In Hungary?”, RFE-RL, June 8, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-orban-china-fudan-budapest/31888800.html
Suzanne Lynch, “Occupy Brussels! Viktor Orbán’s plan for Europe,” Politico, April 8, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-plan-europe-hungary-council-presidency-election/
See here: https://hiia.hu/en/gladden-j-pappin-phd/
Lili Rutai, “Hungary's government is funding European publications. But have they had much success?”, EuroNews, September 16, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/09/16/hungarys-government-is-funding-european-publications-to-little-success
See here: https://www.cpachungary.com/en/
Corentin Leotard, “Hungary's Viktor Orban, banker of Europe's far-right movements,” La Croix International, October 17, 2024, https://international.la-croix.com/world/hungarys-viktor-orban-banker-of-europes-far-right-movements
Ibid.
Vitez Ibolya, “How could Lőrinc Mészáros amass a fortune of 660 billion forints within ten years?”, 24.hu, January 9, 2024, https://24.hu/belfold/2024/01/09/lorinc-meszaros-story-of-the-wealth/
Ibid; Luca Pete, “Hungary’s wealthy elite: Unveiling the top 100 richest individuals,” VSquare, July 11, 2023, https://vsquare.org/hungarys-wealthy-elite-unveiling-the-top-100-richest-individuals/
Luca Pete, “Hungary’s wealthy elite: Unveiling the top 100 richest individuals,” VSquare, July 11, 2023, https://vsquare.org/hungarys-wealthy-elite-unveiling-the-top-100-richest-individuals/
Andrea Dudik and Marton Kasnyik, “As Orban Builds Power, His Son-in-Law Builds a Hotel Empire,” Bloomberg, March 14, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-03-14/viktor-orban-s-son-in-law-is-building-a-hotel-empire-in-hungary
Suzanne Lynch, “Occupy Brussels! Viktor Orbán’s plan for Europe,” Politico, April 8, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-plan-europe-hungary-council-presidency-election/
See here: https://www.statista.com/chart/18794/net-contributors-to-eu-budget/
Suzanne Lynch, “Occupy Brussels! Viktor Orbán’s plan for Europe,” Politico, April 8, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-plan-europe-hungary-council-presidency-election/
Ibid.
Maia De La Baume, “Orbán’s Fidesz quits EPP group in European Parliament,” Politico, March 3, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/epp-suspension-rules-fidesz-european-parliament-viktor-orban-hungary/
Clare Nuttall, “BALKAN BLOG: Hungary’s allies in the Balkans are sabotaging their EU accession hopes,” BNE Intellinews, June 26, 2024, https://www.intellinews.com/balkan-blog-hungary-s-allies-in-the-balkans-are-sabotaging-their-eu-accession-hopes-331102/
See Viktor Orbán’s July 2024 lecture at the 33rd Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp here: https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-33rd-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp/
According to Tax Foundation. See the following: https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/eu/corporate-tax-rates-europe-2024/; https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/eu/capital-gains-tax-rates-in-europe-2024/; https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/eu/top-personal-income-tax-rates-europe-2024/; https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/eu/value-added-tax-2024-vat-rates-europe/
H. David Baer, “Hungary’s New Church Law is Worse than the First,” HDavidBaer.com, December 11, 2018, https://hdavidbaer.com/2018/12/28/hungarys-new-church-law-is-worse-than-the-first/
Ketrin Jochecova, Eddy Wax, and Stuart Lau, “Bulgaria’s new anti-LGBTQ+ law is official. Opponents beg EU to take action.”, Politico, August 16, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-anti-lgbtq-law-ban-propaganda-school-ruman-rudev/
Jorge Liboreiro, “EU completes reform of migration rules despite Poland and Hungary voting against,” EuroNews, May 14, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/05/14/eu-completes-reform-of-migration-rules-despite-poland-and-hungary-voting-against
Alza Kryeziu, “Hungary to Introduce Tighter Rules for Foreign Guest Workers,” Schengen News, September 20, 2024, https://schengen.news/hungary-to-introduce-tighter-rules-for-foreign-guest-workers/
See Viktor Orbán’s July 2024 lecture at the 33rd Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp here: https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-33rd-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp/
Marton Dunai and Valentina Romei, “Why Hungary’s lavish family subsidies failed to spur a baby boom,” Financial Times, August 19, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/3ea257fd-e8ef-4f05-9b89-c9a03ea72af5
See here: https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/hungary/individual/deductions; Fruzsina Albert, “Hungary: Tax exemption for mothers of four or more children,” ESPN Flash Report 2020/17.
Marton Dunai and Valentina Romei, “Why Hungary’s lavish family subsidies failed to spur a baby boom,” Financial Times, August 19, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/3ea257fd-e8ef-4f05-9b89-c9a03ea72af5; See here: https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/hungary/individual/deductions
Ibid.
Ibid.
Pablo Gorondi, “Hungary to give women with 4 or more kids life tax exemption,” AP News, February 10, 2019, https://apnews.com/general-news-fa782634d725431390c3251f1b5e352a
Carlo Martuscelli, “The populist right wants you to make more babies. The question is how,” Politico, September 11, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-populist-right-want-you-make-more-babies-viktor-orban/
Ibid.
See here: https://marriagefoundation.org.uk/research/marriage-we-need-to-talk-about-hungary/; See here: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Marriage_and_divorce_statistics
See Viktor Orbán’s July 2024 lecture at the 33rd Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp here: https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-33rd-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp/
Csaba Moldicz, “A review of the Eastern Opening policy – Hungary’s economic relations with the East,” China-CEE Institute, March 2024, https://china-cee.eu/2024/04/10/hungary-political-briefing-a-review-of-the-eastern-opening-policy-hungarys-economic-relations-with-the-east/; Devin Haas, “Explainer: What is Hungary doing in the Organisation of Turkic States?”, Emerging Europe, January 18, 2023, https://emerging-europe.com/analysis/explainer-what-is-hungary-doing-in-the-organisation-of-turkic-states/
Andras Dezso, “The Roots of Orban’s Strong Bond with Israel and its PM,” Balkan Insight, November 14, 2023, https://balkaninsight.com/2023/11/14/the-roots-of-orbans-strong-bond-with-israel-and-its-pm/; Barak Ravid, “Israel worked to build Hungary's Orban a bridge to Trump White House,” Axios, July 17, 2018, https://www.axios.com/2018/07/17/israel-netanyahu-lobbied-trump-for-hungary-orban
“Rosatom to pour first concrete at Hungary nuclear plant by 2025,” Power Technology, September 25, 2023, https://www.power-technology.com/news/rosatom-hungary-nuclear-plant/
Justin Spike, “Hungary’s Orban criticized for ‘neutrality’ in Ukraine war,” AP News, March 26, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-business-budapest-viktor-orban-c289237f0c626ce9447bd1c78ebcd8ae
Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU ministers fume as ‘outrageous’ Hungary yet again blocks military aid for Ukraine,” Politico, May 27, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ministers-outrageous-hungary-blocks-military-aid-arms-ukraine/
Ibid; Lili Bayer, “Why is Orbán blocking Sweden’s entry to Nato – and what happens next?”, The Guardian, January 24, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/24/why-is-orban-blocking-swedens-entry-to-nato-and-what-happens-next; “Stoltenberg Says Hungary Agrees Not To Block NATO Support To Ukraine,” RFE-RL, June 12, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-chief-visits-hungary-amid-tensions-ukraine/32989322.html
Darko Janjevic, “Putin and Viktor Orban's special relationship,” DW, September 18, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/vladimir-putin-and-viktor-orbans-special-relationship/a-45512712
Jorge Liboreiro, “'It has gone very far:' EU countries voice exasperation over Hungary's vetoes on Ukraine aid,” EuroNews, May 27, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/05/27/it-has-gone-very-far-eu-countries-voice-exasperation-over-hungarys-vetoes-on-ukraine-aid
See Viktor Orbán’s July 2024 lecture at the 33rd Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp here: https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-33rd-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp
Ibid.
Ibid.
Samo Burja, “The End of Industrial Society,” Palladium, March 24, 2021, https://www.palladiummag.com/2021/03/24/the-end-of-industrial-society/
“Hungary's opposition Tisza party ahead of PM Orban's Fidesz in second poll,” Reuters, October 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungarys-opposition-tisza-party-ahead-pm-orbans-fidesz-second-poll-2024-10-24/